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ABSTRACT

As part of a project on Negro employment in the South, this study considers two indicators of the employment status of blacks in the Houston labor market: (1) a penetration rate which shows the degree of entrance into various employment categories, and (2) an index of occupational positions which measures relative status in these categories. In addition, programs to improve black employment patterns are described. The findings indicate structural imbalances; the employment position of blacks in Houston is below average for the nation and typical of the South, in spite of the city's growing economy and shortage of manpower. Noting the outright exclusion of black women from most jobs, the study recommends training to upgrade black men and pressure to eliminate the discriminatory hiring practices which bar black women from employment. (EH)

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NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH

Volume I: The Houston Labor Market

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NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH

Volume I: The Houston Labor Market

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FOREWORD

The study of black employment in the Houston labor market, by Professor Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., is part of a project on Negro Employment in the South sponsored by the Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The basic objectives of this project are to explain the patterns of black employment and to suggest remedies which might improve employment and upgrading opportunities for Negroes.

In each of our studies we are concerned with two basic indicators of the Negroes' relative employment status: (1) A penetration rate, showing the extent to which they have entered various employment categories, and (2) an index of occupational positions showing the relative status they occupy within those categories. We have also examined efforts to improve the Negroes' employment situation.

The present study of Houston relies heavily on data for 1966 collected by the EEOC. Where available, EEOC data for later years are included. The EEOC data have been supplemented significantly by information from a variety of sources and detailed interviews with knowledgeable people in Houston.

We consider cities to be important focuses for studies of Negro employment, because racial problems must be resolved primarily by programs at the metropolitan level supported by State, Federal, and private assistance. This same conviction seems to account for the trend toward decentralizing the administration of manpower and poverty programs as much as possible. Although there are some uniformities, programs must be geared to the realities of each place.

Studies of metropolitan areas also make it possible to come from behind the statistics and give them greater meaning. We are therefore attempting to supplement the purely statistical information with detailed interviews in each metropolitan area.

We are persuaded, moreover, that comparative metropolitan studies will give us greater insights into the unity and diversity of Negro employment in the South. We therefore hope to isolate those patterns and causal relationships that are uniform from city to city from those that are unique to each place.

Although much of this project is devoted to studies of metropolitan areas (Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, Louisville, Memphis, Miami, and New Orleans), the project also includes studies of Negro employment in agriculture, the Federal Government, and State and local governments, fields that all have profound consequences for the South and the Nation. Agri-

culture is important not only because it is by far the most important source of employment for Negroes--despite dramatic outmigration--but also because of its implications for urban problems. Government employment is important as a growth industry and because Negro employment opportunities are influenced by public policies interpreted and carried out by government employees. The Negro's occupational position in government. therefore, has a significance which transcends the importance of the number of jobs involved.

We are planning to release each of these studies separately as they are completed and in a revised form as our final report, which also will include South-non-South and intercity comparisons and our policy recommendations.

The overall direction of this project is being conducted from the University of Kentucky, where Professor Virgil Christian is serving as associate project director and where statistical information has been processed for the persons in charge of the individual studies. Professor Christian and I also are preparing the overall comparisons between the South and the rest of the country as well as the intercity study.

Although Professor Briggs' study follows the general format we have outlined for the other cities, he has developed his own approach to the subject. He has attempted to portray the city's "mood" and institutional arrangements as they influence race relations in general and Negro employment opportunities in particular.

Professor Briggs also describes some of the specific Negro employment patterns in Houston on the basis of data generated by his interviews, the EEOC data, information from the Civil Rights Commission on State and local government, and data on Federal employment in Houston from the study of Negro employment in the Federal Government being undertaken as a part of this project by Mr. Lynn Rittenoure of the University of Texas. In general, these data show most Negroes to be employed at very low levels everywhere in Houston.

Negroes are not only disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs, but two-thirds of them work mainly for small employers who are not accounted for in the EEOC survey of firms hiring 100 or more workers. These employment patterns show Negroes to be in low occupational positions in the higher paying sectors (like those in the petrochemical industries) and such growth industries as State and local government.

The results of the remedial programs in Houston provide very little reason to be optimistic that the trends are being changed very much. Most of the programs have concentrated on entry-level jobs, which do very little to alter the Negro's occupational position. Professor Briggs' conclusions make it clear that Negro employment patterns in Houston will change very slowly, even with a tight labor market, unless measures are taken to cause

some significant institutional changes in education, housing, training programs, and hiring procedures.

Ray Marshall, Director
Negro Employment in
the South Project

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The author is appreciative of the financial assistance provided by grants from (1) the University of Kentucky project funded by the Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to study black employment patterns in the South and (2) the University Research Institute of the University of Texas at Austin. In addition, the author wishes to state his appreciation to William S. Franklin for his assistance in gathering background information; to Gilbert O. Cardenas for his aid in preparing the manuscript; and to Ray Marshall for his extensive comments on earlier drafts. The accuracy of the information and the conclusions drawn are the sole responsibility of the author.

Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.

Austin, Texas
September 1970

CONTENTS

		Page
FOREWORD		iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS		vii
I.	THE SETTING	1
II.	GENERAL INFLUENCES UPON BLACK EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	7
	Poverty	7
	Unemployment and Subemployment	11
	Public Education	17
	Higher Education	22
	Community Organization	24
	Unionism	25
	Political Power	26
	Transportation	27
	The Mexican Americans	32
	Summary	32
III.	SPECIFIC BLACK EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS	33
	Private Industry	33
	Federal Government	54
	Municipal, County, and State Governments	56
	Other Areas	61
	Summary	61
IV.	EFFORTS TO ALTER THE PREVAILING BLACK EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS	65
	The Concentrated Employment Program	65
	The Houston Opportunity Center	72
	The NSC Training Center	73
	HOPE Development Association	75
	The Cresant Foundation	77
	The Christian Rescue Mission	78
	Apprenticeship	78
	The JOBS Program	84
	Model Cities	85
	Vocational Education	86
	Miscellaneous Programs	87
	Summary	91
V.	CONCLUSIONS	93

I. THE SETTING

The rapid growth of the City of Houston since the end of World War II has attracted nationwide interest. Ranking in 1970 as the country's sixth largest city, it is the largest population center in the South. With its proximity to large concentrations of minority people (blacks, Mexican Americans, and Indians), the degree and nature of the participation of these groups in such an expanding labor market is of national significance. In accordance with the mandate of this study, however, attention will focus primarily upon the employment experiences of Houston's black community.

The City of Houston is located in Harris County, one of the five counties that comprise the Houston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). 1/ The Houston SMSA--although small when compared with many eastern seaboard and west coast SMSA's--ranks as the 13th largest in the Nation in 1970. The preliminary 1970 census figures reported that the Houston SMSA totaled 1,957,688 people (an increase of 38 percent over 1960), of whom 1,722,533 lived in Harris County (an increase of 38.6 percent over 1960) and 1,212,967 lived in the City of Houston (an increase of 29.3 percent over 1960).

Especially since the end of World War II, the black population of the City of Houston has been increasing both absolutely and relatively:

Year	Total population	Black population	Percent black
1950	806,700	170,213	21.1
1960	938,200	217,662	23.2
1968 1/	1,200,000	300,000	25.0

1/ Report 2 on Minority Problems and Progress (August 1968), p. 1.

Thus, whereas the population of the city has increased by 49 percent since 1950, the black population has grown by 76 percent. The local antipoverty agency, the Harris County Community Action Agency, attributes the accelerating growth of the black population to: (1) Migrants from rural east Texas; (2) migrants from the rural areas of western and southern Louisiana; and (3) the internal growth of families already living in the city.2/ With the population of the city expected to double its present size by 1990, it is anticipated that the black population will continue to expand its relative share of the total citizenry.

1/ The other four counties--Brazoria, Fort Bend, Liberty, and Montgomery--were added to the Houston SMSA in 1965.

2/ From personal interview with an official of the Harris County Community Action Agency (June 26, 1968).

As a result of the vast open area with sparse population that surrounds the city, Houston has been able to avoid the insular constraints imposed by the rigid boundaries that limit growth and create multiple--often conflicting--governing jurisdictions in other major metropolitan areas. As of 1968, the Houston SMSA encompassed 6,258 square miles, of which the City of Houston embraced 447 square miles. The city, accordingly, was the third largest in land areas in the Nation in 1968 and it is still growing. The jurisdiction of the Houston City Planning Commission, however, ranges over some 2,000 square miles, including all of Harris County and land within a 5-mile radius of the county limits. About 15 percent of the Houston SMSA's population live in approximately 15 incorporated municipalities within the city's boundaries. The city, however, has "floated" around them because of the extremely liberal Texas annexation laws (a city may annex in a year the equivalent of up to 10 percent of its own land area).

The major private employment sources are the chemical, petroleum, nonelectrical manufacturing, medical services, and construction industries. Government is also a prime employer. (See table 1.) The labor market throughout the late sixties has been very tight, with unemployment for the SMSA hovering around 2 percent.

Houston is sometimes referred to as "a southern city that looks western." This description is particularly apt with respect to social legislation. The city does not have a fair employment practices act or a human relations commission with enforceable authority nor does the State of Texas have such a statute or commission. Not until 1969 did Texas enact a State minimum wage law which became effective February 1, 1970. Beginning at $1.25 an hour, the level will be increased to $1.40 an hour in 1971 and to $1.60 an hour in 1972 for covered workers. There are numerous execptions from coverage. The City of Houston does not have a municipal minimum wage law. Also, with regard to social policy, Texas is a "right to work" State, which only comments upon the minimal role assumed by the labor movement in local political affairs.

In welfare legislation, Texas has attained national notoriety for its insensitivity to social needs. It is the only State with a constitutionally stipulated ceiling on expenditures for welfare payments. All welfare funds must come from the State's general revenue fund; budget increases have to be matched with tax increases. Because all Federal welfare programs require some State matching funds, the ceiling restricts the amount of aid for which Texas may qualify. Given the growing number of eligible welfare recipients, the fixed ceiling has reduced payments to individual claimants. By mid-1969, average benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program had declined to a meager $12.50 a month per recipient; for old age pensioners, to $59 a month; for the permanently and totally disabled, to $60 a month; and for the blind, to $71 a month.

An effort to raise the ceiling on State payments from $60 million to $75 million a year was overwhelmingly defeated in November 1968, but the electorate reversed itself in a special election in August 1969 and voted

TABLE 1. LABOR FORCE STATUS FOR THE HOUSTON SMSA, JANUARY 1970

Item	Number
Total civilian labor force	875,700
Employed	859,900
Agriculture	7,100
Manufacturing	147,100
Mining	30,750
Construction	83,600
Transportation, communications, and utilities	67,750
Wholesale and retail trade	205,450
Finance, insurance, and real estate	43,750
Services	186,050
Government	88,350
Idled by disputes	500
Unemployed	15,300
Men	8,800
Women	6,500
Percent unemployed	1.7

Note: Data in this table are based upon the five counties that presently comprise the Houston SMSA; they are not to be confused with data in table 3, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, which are based on the former definition of the SMSA as including only Harris County.

Source: "Manpower Trends: Houston Area, February 1970," Texas Employment Commission.

in favor of a new $80 million ceiling. The increase made Texas eligible for an additional $41 million in Federal monies. As a result, the structure of AFDC payments was altered in 1969 to provide benefits based on a family budget standard of individual needs. The welfare payments are set at 75 percent of the stated figure. The monthly amounts--of which only three-fourths are paid--include $13 for utilities (regardless of family size); $25 per dependent child for food, clothing, and incidentals; and $33 for rent for a family of two (up to a maximum of $50 a month for larger families). The burgeoning number of AFDC recipients (between August 31, 1968 and September 1, 1969, the number of AFDC families in Texas increased 20.6 percent and the number of AFDC children increased 15.9 percent; in Harris County, the respective increases were a phenomenal 68 and 70 percent),3/ combined with the constitutionally stipulated ceiling and a prohibition against deficit spending, has kept the issue volatile. On May 1, 1969, the National Welfare Rights Organization and several VISTA workers turned a group of 140 children loose in the Houston regional offices of the Welfare Department to protest threatened reductions. Similarly, a move in early 1970 to reduce benefits to 66 percent of budgeted needs to accommodate the additions to the welfare ranks triggered demonstrations in Houston and elsewhere in the State. The pressure was only temporarily relieved when the Governor transferred unexpended university construction funds to the Welfare Department to keep payment levels at 75 percent of budgeted needs.

Thus, in these key areas of social policy, Texas in general and Houston in particular have emulated the prevailing attitudes of the South rather than the West.

Consistent with the laissez-faire philosophy toward the labor market is one of the city's most unique features--the absence of zoning laws. Despite the efforts of the Houston Chamber of Commerce to adopt zoning regulations, the voters have overwhelmingly defeated the proposal on three separate occasions. In addition, not until December 1969 did the city adopt any enforceable housing codes. The absence of these provisions has hampered the ability of the city to participate in Federal programs for public housing, urban renewal, urban renewal planning, and the Model Cities program.4/ Complaining about these difficulties, Mayor Louis Welch charged in 1968 that:

> I would submit that the City of Houston has been unfairly deprived of major and important Federal funds for the solution of our local problems of bettering housing and living conditions.

3/ "Annual Report--1969" (Austin: Department of Public Welfare, State of Texas) p. 11.

4/ See "Statement by Roscoe Jones, Director of City Planning for the City of Houston," Hearings Before the National Commission on Urban Problems (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), vol. 3, p. 146.

> I would not argue with the other requirements of the workable program. I would not suggest that other cities should eliminate their zoning. But I submit that Houston is being grossly and unfairly treated in the denial of funds by the arbitrary ruling that we must have zoning or something that, by any other name, amounts to the same thing.5/

Within this broad framework, an analysis of the black employment experience can proceed.

5/ Ibid., pp. 134-135.

II. GENERAL INFLUENCES UPON BLACK EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

POVERTY

According to the Harris County Community Action Agency (HCCAA), the major proportion of the blacks living in Houston are--by Federal standards--"poor." In 1965, HCCAA placed 25 percent of the people in Harris County and 28 percent of the population of the City of Houston in this category.6/ Of these **blacks** represented 53 percent of the poverty population in the county and 59 percent in the city.7/ In absolute terms, these percentages represent a total of 196,603 blacks living in poverty in Harris County and 160,981 living in poverty in the City of Houston in 1965.

Houston does not have a single black ghetto in the customary sense of the word. Rather, it has several enclaves. As figure 1 shows, the three major concentrations of blacks are: (1) A central area called "the original CEP area" because it is the section of the city in which the Labor Department's Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) began operations; (2) "Sunnyside" in south Houston; and (3) "Acre Homes" in northeast Houston (part of which is outside the 1968 city limits).

The "original CEP area" contains about 15 percent of the city's population, and it is the area of greatest concentration of blacks in the city and the SMSA. In 1965, the 22 census tracts which comprised the area had a population of 177,878 people, 60 percent of whom were officially classified as being "poor" by Federal standards. Of the 106,281 poverty population, 75,099 (or 70.6 percent) were black. The area is literally the center of the city. Tracts contained in the grouping almost completely surround City Hall. The Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) plan described the area as follows:

> The target area, with its 22 census tracts, is the central or inner core of the city other than the downtown area. Buildings in the area are generally old and rundown. Freeways are encroaching on the area and there is attrition in the number of housing units due to this. The population total for the CEP area from the 1960

6/ "Dimensions of Poverty--Houston-Harris County Texas 1965," Report of the Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization [this organization subsequently became the HCCAA which is quoted in the text], p. 1.

7/ Ibid., p. 13. Angloes numbered 134,282 (or 36 percent of the poor), and Mexican Americans totaled 39,431 (or 11 percent of the poor).

Figure 1. BLACK POPULATION CENTERS IN THE CITY OF HOUSTON



Note: Groupings are on the basis of census tracts

> Census, compared to estimated for 1965, shows an increase of only 0.5 percent while for Harris County as a whole the increase is 19.5 percent.8/

A study by the U.S. Department of Labor for the period July 1968-June 1969 disclosed that 28.8 percent of the black families (with four members or more) within the area had annual incomes of less than $3,500--a rate that was more than twice the average for the Nation as a whole.9/ The proportion of black families with these low incomes was almost three times that of Mexican Americans living in the area. Table 2 presents the annual income data by color and family status in the CEP area.

Since the "original CEP" tracts represent a virtually stagnant population, the greatest increase in the poverty population is occurring in the Sunnyside area. The area is made up largely of two census tracts whose total population in 1965 was 21,206 people, 95 percent of whom were officially classified as poor. Of the poverty population of 20,191, a total of 20,104 (or 99.6 percent) were blacks.10/ Personal interviews indicate that there is every indication that the appalling concentration of poor blacks in the Sunnyside area has become even more intense since the 1965 statistics were compiled. In contrasting the central CEP tract area with the emerging Sunnyside ghetto, one knowledgeable official said:

> In the central CEP area is where the older people are. They have been down so long that the very thought of rising doesn't even cross their minds. Sunnyside, on the other hand, is where the youth are congregating. We are getting the first gangs formed down there right now. It is where the poverty families moving into Houston first hit. Scott Street is the most volatile area in the entire City.11/

8/ Houston Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS), 1969, p. 22 /hereafter referred to as "CAMPS Plan"/.

9/ "Urban Employment Survey: Houston," (Dallas: Southwest Regional Office, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Oct. 24, 1969), table 3.

10/ Dimensions of Poverty. . . , p. 3.

11/ From personal interview with Gus Taylor, deputy director of the Concentrated Employment Program (June 21, 1968).

TABLE 2. ANNUAL MONEY INCOME BY ETHNIC GROUP AND FAMILY STATUS IN THE "ORIGINAL CEP AREA" OF THE HOUSTON LABOR MARKET, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969

[Percent distribution]

Money income	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo
Families (2 or more members)				
Total: Number	28,400	18,400	6,100	4,000
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$0 to $3,499	28.9	35.3	16.7	19.5
$3,500 to $4,999	18.3	17.9	20.0	14.6
$5,000 to $7,999	30.3	28.8	35.0	31.7
$8,000 to $9,999	10.6	8.7	13.3	14.6
$10,000 or more	12.0	9.2	15.0	19.5
Median income	$5,200	$4,700	$6,000	$6,600
Families (4 or more members)				
Total: Number	13,100	8,300	3,900	1,100
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$0 to $3,499	21.2	28.8	10.3	21.4
$3,500 to $4,999	16.7	16.3	15.4	14.3
$5,000 to $7,999	32.6	31.3	35.9	14.3
$8,000 to $9,999	12.9	11.3	17.9	21.4
$10,000 or more	16.7	12.5	20.5	28.6
Median income	$6,000	$5,400	$6,800	$8,000
Unrelated individuals				
Total: Number	16,700	10,600	1,500	4,500
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$0 to $3,499	66.7	71.4	73.3	56.8
$3,500 to $4,999	16.1	15.2	20.0	20.5
$5,000 to $7,999	12.5	10.5	6.7	15.9
$8,000 to $9,999	2.4	1.9	0	2.3
$10,000 or more	2.4	1.0	0	4.5
Median income	$2,300	$2,200	$2,400	$3,100

Note: The figures for Mexican Americans include "other Spanish surname Americans" used in Bureau of Labor Statistics tables. Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey for July 1968-June 1969, U.S. Department of Labor.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND SUBEMPLOYMENT

As is the case nationally, the aggregate unemployment figures for the SMSA (such as those stated in table 1) conceal the high concentration of unemployment in the central city areas and in the minority labor force. To remedy this shortcoming, the U.S. Department of Labor has conducted special studies of unemployment and underemployment in the central cities of the Nation's 20 largest SMSA's. The findings for Houston are presented in table 3 for 1967, 1968, and 1969. The nonwhite rate (which in Houston is virtually synonymous for blacks since the Spanish surname category is included within the white rate) is more than twice the white rate for each year. It is also apparent from the figures that the black labor force is concentrated in the central city since the survey estimates all of the black unemployment in the SMSA to be in that area.

Narrowing the focus within the central city to the parts of town where the black population is centered, the unemployment rate for blacks in the "original CEP area" for the period July 1968-June 1969 was found to be 9.5 percent. The survey--conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor as a part of its new data collection program (known as the Urban Employment Survey)--found that nearly one-third of this area's full-time workers earned less than $65 a week (i.e., the equivalent of the Federal minimum wage).12/ Some additional disclosures of the survey were: Black teenagers had an unemployment rate of 38 percent (1½ times higher than the national rate); 25 percent of all workers experienced some unemployment during the year (two times higher than the national rate); 25 percent of the men and women not working or looking for work wanted a job immediately; less than one-third of the workers had completed high school; and adult workers were most likely to be employed in unskilled occupations (21 percent of adult men were nonfarm laborers, 12 percent of the adult men workers in service occupations, and 59 percent of adult women were employed in service occupations--mostly in private households).

The data contained in the Urban Employment Survey cover about 26 percent of the black civilian labor force in the SMSA. (See table 4.) The overall labor force participation rate for blacks of 69.6 percent masks a great diversity of experience between the various subgroups. The 83.4-percent rate for black men (20 years and over) was higher than the national figure of 81.1 percent for the same group for the comparable timespan; the participation rate for black women (20 years and over) of 61.3 percent is significantly higher than the 52.9-percent participation rate for all black women in the Nation; and the 57.1-percent participation rate for black teenagers (ages 16 to 19) was also higher than the comparable 41.2 percent for the Nation. Thus, it is clear that, compared to the national experience, a larger percentage of blacks in the CEP area of Houston are formally

12/ "Urban Employment Survey."

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS AND RATES IN HOUSTON SMSA AND CENTRAL CITY AREA, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1967 THROUGH 1969

Category	Total	White	Black and other races
Unemployment SMSA			
Level:			
1967	22,000	13,000	9,000
1968	22,000	14,000	8,000
1969	23,000	13,000	9,000
Rate:			
1967	3.3	2.4	6.3
1968	3.3	2.6	5.7
1969	3.2	2.3	6.7
Unemployment central city			
Level:			
1967	20,000	11,000	9,000
1968	18,000	9,000	8,000
1969	17,000	8,000	9,000
Rate:			
1967	3.7	2.7	6.3
1968	3.4	2.5	5.8
1969	3.3	2.1	6.6

Note: In this table *only*, the SMSA definition is that used by the State employment security agency based upon 1960 definitions of the SMSA. Hence, the SMSA is Harris County alone. Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: *Manpower Report of the President, 1968, Manpower Report of the President, 1970,* and *Employment and Earnings,* April 1970, p. 5.

TABLE 4. EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY ETHNIC GROUP, AGE, AND SEX IN THE "ORIGINAL CEP AREA" OF THE HOUSTON LABOR MARKET, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969

Employment status	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo
Both sexes, 16 years and over				
Civilian noninstitutional population	82,200	51,400	17,300	13,500
Civilian labor force	54,500	35,800	10,700	8,000
Civilian labor force participation rate	66.3	69.6	61.8	59.3
Employed	50,000	32,300	10,000	7,600
Full time	35,000	21,900	7,400	5,700
Part time	11,800	8,300	2,000	1,400
With job but not working	3,100	2,100	600	400
Unemployed	4,500	3,400	700	400
Unemployment rate	8.3	9.5	6.5	5.0
Not in labor force	27,700	15,600	6,600	5,500
Men, 20 years and over				
Civilian noninstitutional population	34,000	20,500	7,200	6,300
Civilian labor force	28,400	17,100	6,500	4,800
Civilian labor force participation rate	83.5	83.4	90.3	76.2
Employed	[1] 27,400	[1] 16,400	[1] 6,400	[1] 4,600
Full time	21,100	12,400	5,100	3,600
Part time	4,500	2,800	1,000	700
Unemployed	1,000	700	100	200
Unemployment rate	3.5	4.1	1.5	4.2
Not in labor force	5,600	3,400	700	1,500
Women, 20 years and over				
Civilian noninstitutional population	38,800	25,300	7,300	6,300
Civilian labor force	20,800	15,500	2,700	2,600
Civilian labor force participation rate	53.6	61.3	37.0	41.3
Employed	[1] 18,900	[1] 14,000	[1] 2,500	[1] 2,400
Full time	11,800	8,400	1,700	1,800
Part time	5,800	4,700	600	500
Unemployed	1,800	1,500	200	100
Unemployment rate	8.7	9.7	7.4	3.8
Not in labor force	18,000	9,800	4,600	3,700
Both sexes, 16 to 19 years				
Civilian noninstitutional population	9,400	5,600	2,800	1,000
Civilian labor force	5,300	3,200	1,500	700
Civilian labor force participation rate	56.4	57.1	53.6	70.0
Employed	[1] 3,700	[1] 2,000	[1] 1,200	[1] 500
Full time	2,000	1,100	600	300
Part time	1,500	900	500	200
Unemployed	1,600	1,200	300	100
Unemployment rate	30.2	37.5	20.0	14.3
Not in labor force	4,100	2,400	1,300	300

[1] Includes "with job but not working," not shown separately.

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey, U.S. Department of Labor.

in the labor market. They either have jobs or are actively seeking employment.

When these figures are compared with the aforementioned income figures in table 2, the conclusion is inescapable: a significant number of black workers are employed at jobs that do not provide sufficient income to pull a family above the minimal poverty standards of the Nation. The point is reinforced by the higher incidence of unemployment experienced by blacks (see table 5) during the previous year. The existence of a sizable number of blacks (5,500 people) who are not technically in the civilian labor force but who also desire jobs immediately is documented by table 6. These individuals were not employed for 1 hour for pay nor did they actively seek or make themselves available for work. Nonetheless, they reported that they desired to work now. The major reasons given for not looking for work--health factors, old age, or school attendance--indicate a desire for a job but probably mean that many of these individuals would like to work part time if they believed such job opportunities to be available. The barrier caused by family responsibilities indicates the need for additional day-care facilities for the children of low-income families. Thus, it must be kept in mind that the official unemployment figures understate the magnitude of black unemployment--especially among women. For unless a person meets the labor force attachment test of being "available" and "actively seeking" employment, he is excluded from the unemployment tabulation. One official of the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) glibly commented:

> There is a sizable labor pool in Houston but their participation in the labor market is restricted by limited education, lack of skills, illiteracy, and poor work habits. I call this group the unpotential labor force. They are mostly women.13/

The gist of these considerations is that underemployment is rampant among the black labor force in Houston.

Unfortunately, similar detailed data are not available for the other two black ghettos in the city. The Texas Employment Commission, however, "unofficially" estimated the black unemployment rate in 1968 in the Acre Homes area to be 7.0 percent and in the Sunnyside area to be 5.7 percent.

13/ From personal interview with a statistician for the Texas Employment Commission, Houston, Tex. (June 19, 1968).

TABLE 5. UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE DURING PREVIOUS YEAR BY ETHNIC GROUP, AGE, AND SEX IN THE "ORIGINAL CEP AREA" OF THE HOUSTON LABOR MARKET, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969

[Percent distribution]

Weeks of unemployment	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo
Both sexes, 16 years and over				
Total working or looking for work	62,100	41,000	12,300	8,900
Percent with unemployment	24.6	26.6	23.6	18.0
Total with unemployment: Number	15,300	10,900	2,900	1,600
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 to 4 weeks	51.0	48.6	56.7	53.3
5 to 14 weeks	27.5	26.6	26.7	33.3
15 to 26 weeks	13.1	15.6	10.0	6.7
27 weeks or more	8.5	9.2	6.7	6.7
Men, 20 years and over				
Total working or looking for work	29,700	17,800	6,800	5,100
Percent with unemployment	17.2	18.5	14.7	15.7
Total with unemployment: Number	5,100	3,300	1,000	800
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 to 4 weeks	46.2	46.9	(1)	(1)
5 to 14 weeks	26.9	25.0	(1)	(1)
15 to 26 weeks	17.3	18.8	(1)	(1)
27 weeks or more	9.6	9.4	(1)	(1)
Women, 20 years and over				
Total working or looking for work	24,900	18,400	3,600	2,900
Percent with unemployment	24.1	25.5	25.0	13.8
Total with unemployment: Number	6,000	4,700	900	400
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 to 4 weeks	49.2	46.8	(1)	(1)
5 to 14 weeks	29.5	29.8	(1)	(1)
15 to 26 weeks	11.5	12.8	(1)	(1)
27 weeks or more	9.8	10.6	(1)	(1)
Both sexes, 16 to 19 years				
Total working or looking for work	7,600	4,800	2,000	800
Percent with unemployment	55.3	60.4	50.0	50.0
Total with unemployment: Number	4,200	2,900	1,000	400
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 to 4 weeks	57.1	53.3	(1)	(1)
5 to 14 weeks	23.8	23.3	(1)	(1)
15 to 26 weeks	11.9	13.3	(1)	(1)
27 weeks or more	7.1	10.0	(1)	(1)

[1] Percent distribution is not shown because base is 1,000 or less.

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey, U.S. Department of Labor.

TABLE 6. REASONS NOT LOOKING AND FUTURE JOBSEEKING INTENTIONS OF PERSONS NOT IN THE LABOR FORCE WHO WANT A JOB NOW, BY ETHNIC GROUP, IN THE "ORIGINAL CEP AREA" OF THE HOUSTON LABOR MARKET, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969

[Percent distribution]

Reasons not looking for work	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo	Intend to look in next 12 months
Total: Number	9,500	5,500	2,900	1,100	6,100
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Retirement, old age, or school	21.1	23.6	17.2	27.3	23.0
Family responsibilities	23.2	21.8	31.0	18.2	23.0
Health	25.3	29.1	17.2	27.3	21.3
Looked but couldn't find a job	4.2	3.6	6.9	0	4.9
Transportation	5.3	3.6	6.9	9.1	4.9
Too old or young	3.2	1.8	3.4	9.1	3.3
Lack of skill, experience, or education	10.5	9.1	10.3	9.1	11.5
Lack of references, police record	1.1	1.8	0	0	1.6
Other reasons	6.3	5.5	6.9	0	6.6

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey, U.S. Department of Labor.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Black youth almost exclusively attend public schools. In Harris County, there are 20 separate school districts, each operated on an independent basis (i.e., not administered by a formal body of local government). The largest of these, the Houston Independent School District (HISD), with 245,396 students enrolled in 1968, ranked as the sixth largest school system in the Nation and the largest in the South. HISD accounts for about 60 percent of the total number of students enrolled in the public schools of Harris County. During the 1968-69 school year, approximately 32 percent of the students in HISD were black. The HISD employed 15,000 people in 1968--12,000 of whom were instructional personnel. About 30 percent of the teachers were black.

The school board that administers the operations of HISD has since 1955 (when school integration became an issue) been a frequent topic of controversy--especially within the black community. In November 1969, a reform slate of candidates won a majority of the seats on the board on a platform that pledged compliance with both the letter and spirit of court desegregation proposals. This attitude is sharp contrast to the policies espoused by preceding boards. The new board, which is elected on a districtwide basis, has one black member among its seven members.

The last vestiges of de jure separate schools were not eliminated from HISD until September 1967, when a "freedom of choice plan" was inaugurated allowing students to transfer to schools of their choice in the district. On February 11, 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice sought a court order which called for the end of the "freedom-of-choice plan" and for a more extensive integration of school facilities. In its brief to the court, it was charged that the plan had failed to "disestablish the dual school system." 14/ Mrs. Gertrude Barnstone, who at the time represented a minority view on the old school board, concurred with the Justice Department's contention. She claimed that: "Parents in the ghetto areas have never really had a choice. They couldn't get their children to the white schools because of the lack of transportation." 15/ She added that the existing boundary system had been gerrymandered to exclude blacks from all-white schools. She was quoted as saying that Federal action was the only way to "desegregate the district..." [since the]"... conservative majority only do what they're forced to do by the Federal government." 16/ The head of Houston's chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People agreed with Mrs. Barnstone's assessment. 17/

14/ "Officials Answer US Motion: Schools Integrated As Can Be," The Houston Chronicle, Feb. 12, 1969, p. 1.
15/ Ibid.
16/ Ibid., p. 15.
17/ Ibid.

In its petition the Federal Government contended that 81.7 percent of the black students in HISD were enrolled in schools that are 95 percent black; 79.8 percent of the white students in HISD were enrolled in schools that are 95 percent white; in schools which have more than 95 percent black enrollment, 92.7 percent of the faculty are black; and in schools which have more than 95 percent white enrollment, 94.1 percent of the faculty are white. The brief requested the court to order HISD to "formulate and adopt" a new student assignment plan and to assign teachers in proportion to the overall racial composition of all teachers (i.e., under the present overall ratio every school's faculty would be 70-percent white and 30-percent black) until racially identifiable schools are eliminated from the system. The school board's attorney at that time was quoted as saying that the proposal, if implemented, "would be chaotic." 18/

When the superintendent of the HISD asked U.S. Congressman Robert C. Eckhardt (whose district includes Houston) to use his influence to reduce the Justice Department's pressure for integration, Eckhardt refused to comply and charged:

> I believe the Houston School Board has never really accepted the Supreme Court's decision and what has been done in the location and assignment of children to schools within its jurisdiction has been done in a spirit of frustrating the effect of that decision. It is this, primarily that has made it so difficult to resolve our school problem in Harris County. Only the extremes are presented as possibilities. 19/

Eckhardt went on to say in his open letter that: "It would certainly be grossly improper for me to call the Justice Department and tell them to call off their suit, if that is what you are asking." 20/ The Houston Post, during the interval of this public exchange, wrote the following editorial:

> Houston is a desegregated city. It has been for a long time. Black and white citizens get along easily and pleasantly together in desegregated office buildings, buses, airplanes, drug stores, restaurants, hotels, colleges and universities, libraries and public parks.

18/ Ibid., p. 1.
19/ "Busing Called 'Straw Man' in School Fight," The Houston Post, Mar. 28, 1969, p. 5.
20/ Ibid.

> Only the public schools--the PUBLIC schools--are burdened with half measures and token integration. Only the Houston School Board has moved with stupid slowness in the inevitable and rewarding growth of Houston as a cosmopolitan city in which all citizens enjoy the same rights and public facilities. 21/

Nonetheless, HISD decided to appeal to the courts to stay the Justice Department's directives. On July 23, 1969, the U.S. District Court in Houston granted permission for HISD to continue its "freedom of choice" plan for 1 additional year. But it also ruled that the school board must implement by September 1970 either a new school zoning plan or establish a school pairing plan. Under the latter proposal, black and white schools that are reasonably close to each other would have their students bused between their respective areas until a desired level of racial balance is achieved. The judge declared his preference for the establishment of new school districts. Claiming that busing "creates more problems than it solves," he favored the drawing of new boundaries which would "zig-zag" until each school's enrollment is at least 10-percent black or 10-percent white. In his ruling, Judge Ben Connally offered the following dictum:

> Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that integration is an end in itself. It is sort of a public policy that must be achieved regardless of the desires of the children themselves.... I take pride in the fact we have made as much progress as we have in orderly fashion. Only 16 to 18 percent of the 84,000 Negro students are not attending desegregated schools, however, and this in not enough in my judgment. The Court is obligated to achieve the desired level. 22/

In October 1969, a "re-examination" of the figures on integration that were submitted earlier to the district court revealed that "rather than tripling, as reported, desegregation here has barely inched forward." 23/ The revised totals disclosed that only 13,820 black students (or 16 percent of the total black enrollment in HISD) and 21,914 white students (or 14 percent of the total white enrollment in HISD) were attending desegregated schools. The court's definition of a desegregated school was one in which 10 percent or

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21/ "The School Bus Nonsense," The Houston Post, Mar. 26, 1969, sec. 3, p. 2.

22/ "Houston is Told to Desegregate its Schools by September 1970," The New York Times, July 24, 1969, p. 10.

23/ "Racial Mix Here Slower Than Reported," The Houston Post, Oct. 30, 1969, p. 2.

more of the students constitute either a white or black minority. The net increase in students (black or white) attending desegregated schools between the 1968-69 and 1969-70 school terms was a mere 666 students.

On June 1, 1970, Judge Connally ruled on a new plan submitted by the school board. 24/ His decision accepted an "equidistant zoning plan" that requires school zones to be drawn exactly equal from adjacent schools. Pupils are required to attend the school nearest their homes. Exceptions are permitted only if the student elects to transfer voluntarily to a school where his race is in the minority or in individual instances where there are geographical barriers--as rivers or freeways. His ruling specifically forbade "freedom of choice" because "it does not achieve a sufficiently high incidence of integration." 25/ Moreover, it also ruled out busing as a means of achieving integration. The court held that "no Supreme Court decision and no other controlling authority with which I am familiar requires that a predetermined ratio be established, and children bused from distant areas to meet those quotas." 26/

On August 25, 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit slightly modified the plan by implementing a "geographic capacity zoning system." Under this plan, the size of school zones is determined by the capacity of the schools with allowances made for natural hazards (e.g., freeways, rivers). The effect of the plan is to eliminate every all-black secondary school and every school (at any level) attended by more than 90 percent blacks. When schools opened in September, however, there were serious protests that the racial integration that occurred was mainly the result of Chicano students (who were not treated as a separate ethnic minority) being restricted into predominately black schools. The 35,000 Mexican Americans in the Houston Independent School District are, for integration purposes, considered whites. 27/

The need for concern as to the level of educational attainment of minority workers is made clear from the findings of the aforementioned Urban Employment Survey that are presented in table 7. To repeat, the

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24/ "Here is Text of Desegregation Opinion by Judge Connally," The Houston Chronicle, June 2, 1970, p. 4.

25/ Ibid.

26/ Ibid.

27/ "Houston ' Huelga' Schools Open in a Mexican American Protest," The New York Times, Sept. 6, 1970, p. 36.

TABLE 7. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF WORKERS BY AGE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP FOR THE "ORIGINAL CEP AREA" OF THE HOUSTON LABOR MARKET, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969

[Percent distribution]

Age, sex, and ethnic group	Total		No school years completed	Elementary		High School		College		Median years completed
	Number	Percent		1-7 yrs.	8 yrs.	1-3 yrs.	4 yrs.	1-3 yrs.	4 yrs. or more	
Both sexes, 18 years and over										
All persons	52,300	100.0	2.5	26.6	9.0	29.4	22.4	6.9	3.3	10.2
Black	34,500	100.0	1.2	22.1	8.1	33.1	23.8	8.1	3.5	10.7
White	17,800	100.0	4.5	35.6	10.2	22.6	19.8	4.5	2.8	9.0
Mexican American	10,000	100.0	7.9	44.6	9.9	20.8	13.9	2.0	1.0	7.6
Anglo	7,800	100.0	1.3	22.5	10.0	26.3	26.3	7.5	6.3	10.9
Men, 25 years and over										
All persons	24,300	100.0	3.3	34.2	9.9	25.1	17.3	6.6	3.7	9.3
Black	14,800	100.0	1.4	29.1	10.1	29.1	19.6	7.4	3.4	10.0
White	9,500	100.0	6.3	42.1	9.5	18.9	13.7	5.3	4.2	8.2
Mexican American	5,200	100.0	9.6	53.8	9.6	15.4	9.6	1.9	0	6.2
Anglo	4,300	100.0	0	27.9	11.6	23.3	20.9	7.0	9.3	10.3
Women, 25 years and over										
All persons	17,500	100.0	2.3	25.7	8.0	31.4	22.9	5.7	4.0	10.3
Black	13,100	100.0	1.5	23.7	7.6	33.6	22.9	6.1	4.6	10.5
White	4,400	100.0	6.8	31.8	9.1	22.7	22.7	4.5	2.3	9.3
Mexican American	2,200	100.0	9.1	45.5	9.1	22.7	13.6	0	0	7.3
Anglo	2,300	100.0	0	17.4	13.0	26.1	30.4	8.7	4.3	11.2

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey, U.S. Department of Labor.

covered labor force depicted by the data represents about 26 percent of the black labor force for the period July 1968-June 1969. The median level of black educational attainment in Houston of 10.7 years was below the comparable national rate of 11.1 years. Although the black educational attainment levels are considerably higher than those of Mexican Americans, the unemployment rate for blacks was significantly higher. (See table 4.) Moreover, as will be shown in chapter III, the employment penetration rates and the occupational position of Chicanos in the Houston labor market are likewise more favorable that those of blacks.

HIGHER EDUCATION

There are five private and two State-supported universities in Houston, with a combined enrollment of about 30,000 students (including those going part time) in 1968. The private colleges (Dominican College, Houston Baptist College, Rice University, the University of Saint Thomas, and the South Texas College of Law) accounted for only about 4,000 students--few of whom are black. The two public institutions, Texas Southern University and the University of Houston, are the major source of opportunity for blacks for advanced education. Racial enrollment figures are available for full-time students only. They are presented in table 8 for the academic year 1968-69.

Texas Southern University (TSU) was established as a State-supported institution in 1947. Almost all of its students are black. TSU has schools of law, business, pharmacy, arts and sciences, and industries. It also offers graduate programs in a number of areas. In conjunction with TSU's espoused goals of closing the gap between black and white students at the same level of study, special classes in compensatory education and dropout reduction, geared to the deficiencies of individual students, are conducted by its Reading and Study Skills Center. TSU also has begun to assume a more active role in the problems of the Houston community. The School of Business, for example, has initiated special classes to meet the needs of small black entrepreneurs; the School of Pharmacy conducts special programs for churches, schools, and civic groups on the use and abuse of narcotics; the African Studies Program has been expanded to meet the growing demand for awareness of minority history; the School of Industries has been upgrading its curriculum to meet the requests for competent industrial arts teachers and technically trained students; and each summer since 1965 the Vocational Guidance Institute has been conducted on the campus in an attempt to broaden the exposure of public school personnel from predominantly black schools to employment needs and opportunities in private industry. The recognized role of TSU in the Houston community is synthesized by the university's mission as expressed by its president, Dr. Granville M. Sawyer:

> Texas Southern University must become in its entirety a living laboratory which seeks continually to discover ways of administering successfully to the student who, as a learning

TABLE 8. ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION OF FULL-TIME STUDENTS ENROLLED IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING IN THE CITY OF HOUSTON FOR THE FALL SEMESTER, 1968

Institution	Total full-time students	Black students	Mexican American students
Dominican College	237	6	20
Houston Baptist College	854	75	42
Rice University	2,126	16	27
South Texas Junior College	905	1	273
Texas Southern University	3,330	3,318	3
University of Houston	12,827	418	456
University of Saint Thomas	1,007	56	51
Total	21,286	3,890	872

Source: *Survey of Enrollment of Institutions of Higher Education, 1968*, Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

> organism, has had the normal process of learning arrested by externally induced conditions within his culture. 28/

With a total enrollment in 1968 of 23,718 students, the University of Houston is the largest institution of higher learning in the city. The university's campus is bordered by one of the large black population centers and it is estimated that about 2,000 blacks attend classes on a full-or part-time basis.

Although there are four junior colleges in the Houston area, only one is located within the city limits: South Texas Junior College, which was founded by the YMCA in 1948. In 1968 the school broke with the YMCA and became a private, nontax-supported institution. As shown in table 8, there was only one black student enrolled full time in 1968. Efforts to set up a state-supported junior college have been repeatedly rebuffed by the city's voters who apparently wish to avoid the increased tax burden. Houston legislators made an unsuccessful attempt in 1969 to induce the Texas legislature to match the sum a locality would approve to establish a public junior college. Speaking directly to the Houston case, one legislator from central Texas chastised the Houston voters:

> You folks really want to pay only the cost? We all know you have a need, but the voters didn't think they had a big enough need to pass a bond issue. How big a bond issue did they pass to build the Astrodome? 29/

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

One of the most striking features of the Houston scene is the almost total lack of black community organization. Although there are five NAACP chapters in the city, a chapter of the Urban League was not formed until late 1968. There is no branch of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has conducted a small program in conjunction with its Operation Breadbasket project but has not done much in the employment area. There are student groups at Texas Southern University and the University of Houston, but to date these organizations have concerned themselves largely with either campus issues or national problems rather than local community affairs.

Although in many northern cities the leadership of community organizations has been gradually shifting away from exclusive domination by ministers, the South has yet to witness many such changes. In Houston, the more active community groups are still led by ministers. The Reverend Earl Allen has been one of the more outspoken critics of the plight of blacks in

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28/ "TSU Expands Curriculum," The Houston Post, Mar. 9, 1969, sec. 12, p. 3.

29/ "Junior College Bill Revamped," The Houston Post, Apr. 3, 1969, p. 14.

Houston. Through the HOPE Development Fund (discussed in chapter IV), he had sought to meld a grassroots organization to amplify the black position on crucial city decisions. The Reverend William Lawson has served as the local sponsor of the aforementioned Operation Breadbasket project of SCLC. Also, the Reverend L.J. Woodward has been active in the work of the Christian Rescue Mission.

In spite of the efforts of these leaders, the black community has yet to produce a local organization with the necessary broad support to express its needs in a politically effective manner. Explanations for this phenomenon offered by local antipoverty workers are the geographic dispersion of the black community; the divisive effects of the city's numerous freeways; and the constant flux among the black population. For although a large number of poor blacks migrate into Houston each year from rural areas, many apparently stay only until they can gather sufficient funds to move to California. This migration pattern is one of the reasons for the Kerner Commission's finding that 75 percent of the blacks in Los Angeles came from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama. 30/ It is quite likely that Houston is serving as a "way station" to the West although there is no official documentation for the hypothesis.

UNIONISM

In many cities, trade unionism has secured substantial economic gains for large numbers of workers in the local labor markets. In Houston, local AFL-CIO officials estimate that only 15 percent of the labor market is organized. 31/ Moreover, the preponderance of union members are in certain sectors: Construction, steel, petroleum, longshoring, and Federal employment. About one-third of the union members in the city are in the construction crafts. For blacks, union construction jobs have been only on a token basis outside the laborer and cement masons ranks. 32/ Moreover, local officials of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission report more opposition from unions than from employers in the promulgation of equal employment policies. One EEOC spokesman explained the situation in unionized manufacturing industries as follows:

> We are getting more opposition from organized labor than from employers. The employer is out to sell products and get profits for the stockholders. He doesn't really care who produces the products. But to get maximum production

30/ Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 240.

31/ From personal interview with Don Horn, vice president, District 3, of the Texas AFL-CIO, Houston, Tex. (June 27, 1968).

32/ See F. Ray Marshall and Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., The Negro and Apprenticeship (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 175-181. Interviews in 1969 confirm the continued paucity of blacks in the crafts (see chapter IV of this study).

he must get all of the workers to work together and get along with one another. Here is where the real rub comes in. In most plants, the Anglos out number the Negroes and since the employer must get along with all of them he usually sides with the majority.

Labor unions are unwilling to sign contracts that give equal treatment to Negroes. Too often Negroes are seen to be a threat to their jobs and they'd rather see one of their own in the positions that a minority member might hold or be promoted into. In order to get a change in the line of progression, a Negro is often asked to waive all of his previous seniority and start at the bottom of the new line. Or, as is becoming the increasing pattern, they now say that the Negroes must take a test to enter that line. Employers wouldn't do this if unions didn't make them sign agreements to do so. 33/

To the degree that these impressions are valid, unionism has not served as a major force for the improvement of the employment status of black workers. On occasion, however, the attempts to form a political coalition between organized labor and the black community have borne results--as in the election of Senator Barbara Jordan as the only black State senator. On the whole, however, the political bonds between the two groups have been tenuous.

POLITICAL POWER

With the abolition of the poll tax for Federal, State, and local elections during the 1960's, minority groups throughout Texas began to participate on a mass scale in the political processes. Texas laws that require annual voter registration, 1 year of residency, and specify a January 31st registration cutoff date still pose obstacles to wider voter participation by minority groups. In spite of these procedural obstacles, it is the citywide system of electing government officials at large that is the most significant limitation on black political action. Since 1947, Houston has had a "strong mayor-council" form of government. The mayor is the chief administrator and is elected directly by citywide election. He has the power to name department heads and to direct their actions. Likewise, the city comptroller and all eight members of the city council are elected on a citywide basis, although five council members must live in prescribed districts. Prior to 1955, the council members were elected on a district basis with only the residents of that district allowed to vote for their council member, but an amendment to the city charter that year

33/ From personal interview with a Houston representative of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Houston, Tex. (June 24, 1968).

abolished the ward system. There is little doubt that the growing black population was the major consideration that led to the change. 34/ As a result, it is extremely difficult to elect a racially representative city government. In 1970, the Mayor, all eight members of the council, and the comptroller were white. Although there have been black candidates, there has never been a black citizen elected to any of these municipal positions.

A similar practice exists with regard to the election of other State and national officials. There are three U.S. congressional districts (7, 8, and 22) in Houston. Congruent with the boundaries of the U.S. congressional districts are three Texas legislative districts. The legislative districts have 6, 6, and 7 State representatives respectively; but the representatives are elected collectively rather than by individual wards within each district. Even though blacks represent 25 percent of the city's population, there was only one black among the 19 State representatives from Houston in 1969. All three U.S. Representatives were white. There are four separate State senatorial districts within which only the people of that district can vote for one senator. Accordingly, there was one black State senator from Houston in 1969.

TRANSPORTATION

As is the case in many urban areas, public transportation in Houston has become a serious barrier to better employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups. With the minority population located in various enclaves in or near the center of the city and employment opportunities expanding in outlying regions of the sprawling labor market, inadequate public transportation is an obstacle to labor mobility. The magnitude of the issue was underscored by the report in 1968 of the Houston Coordinating Committee of the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) which concluded:

> The lack of truly adequate public transportation is one of the major weaknesses in the overall transportation picture in the Houston area. In certain specific areas, public transportation is quite limited or, as a practical matter,

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34/ If there is any question that the move from the ward system to the citywide system of electing councils in the South was designed to keep blacks from being elected to council positions, one should read "A Surprising Talk Between a Black Leader and a Top Segregationist," The New York Times Magazine, Apr. 27, 1969. About the time the procedural change was made in Houston (in 1955), the political forces throughout Texas were doing things to stem the tide of integration. In 1957, for example, the State legislature passed legislation to require separate schools for black and white children, to empower cities to enact ordinances providing for racial segregation, to require railroads to provide separate facilities in depots, and to ban sports events between persons of different races.

> non-existent. The lack of readily available public transportation in some areas of metropolitan Houston has a definite limiting effect on worker mobility. 35/

This same CAMPS body reported in 1970 that, if anything, the transportation problem for minority workers living in the target area of central Houston had become more acute:

> Transportation will continue to be an ever increasing problem as existing freeways and streets are already overcrowded during peak hours. Public transportation to many industrial sites is non-existent. Travel on existing bus routes to the widely scattered industrial activities is not feasible for many residents of target areas due to travel time required. There is general agreement that a mass rapid transportation system is an immediate necessity; however, progress to date is still at the study stage. 36/

Figure 2 indicates the location of the employing units within the City of Houston for 1967. When compared with figure 1 which shows the concentration of the black population, it is readily apparent that the major employment sources are located outside the black ghettos. Sunnyside is located in section 17 of figure 2 (an area with a scant 0 to 249 employing units); and Acre Homes is located in section 14 of figure 2 (an area with 250 to 499 employing units); and a large portion of "the original CEP area" is located in sections 22 and 4 of figure 2 (areas with 250 to 499 employing units). A large portion of the remainder of "the original CEP area" bounds the central business district (which affords primarily jobs in white-collar occupations) in section 1 of figure 2.

The largest individual employing units--especially for blue-collar workers--in Houston are, for the most part, located outside the city limits. That is to say, such large employers as Sinclair Oil, Champion Paper, Sheffield Steel, Shell Oil, Rohm and Haas Chemical, Diamond Alkali, Humble Oil, Du Pont Chemical, and many others are all east of the boundaries of the city along the ship channel. The area is represented by section 27 in figure 3 and is known as the Port of Houston. In terms of annual tonnage, it is the third largest port in the United States. The Harris County-Houston Ship Channel Navigation District, which is the entity that supervises the operations of the port, estimated in early 1970

35/ CAMPS Plan, p. 13.

36/ The Gulf Coast Comprehensive Manpower Plan--Fiscal Year 1971, Part A, (Jan. 31, 1970), p. 8.

Figure 2. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYING UNITS — 1967



Source: Texas Employment Commission

Note: Groupings are on the basis of contiguous census tracts.

Figure 3. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYING UNITS IN HARRIS COUNTY



Note: Groupings are on the basis of contiguous census tracts.

that this industrial area employs about 110,000 workers (or about one-twelfth of the population of the Houston metropolitan area and one-ninth of the civilian work force of the SMSA). 37/ It is obvious, therefore, that there is substance to the frequently cited saying that Houston is the city "that built a port that built a city." This industrial complex is from 8 to 20 miles from the black population center in "the original CEP area" and even further from Sunnyside and Acre Homes.

Relatedly, the gigantic new U.S. Steel facility that will open in the early 1970's is located about 30 miles east of the center of the City of Houston on the outskirts of Baytown. Although the new complex is technically outside the Houston SMSA (it abuts section 29 in figure 3), it is not necessarily beyond the reaches of the Houston labor market. Similarly, the famous National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) headquarters are also located about 25 miles southeast of the center of Houston (in the far southeast corner of section 28 in figure 3) on the outskirts of Clear Lake City.

The point is that the largest employing sectors are increasingly found far distant from the centers of black population. Hence, adequate transportation is mandatory if blacks are to share in the quality jobs afforded by these enterprises. The relatively high wages paid by many of these businesses may partially offset the shortcomings of available transportation and the continuing patterns of housing segregation. But, as will be shown in the following chapter of this study when the employment figures by industry for the SMSA are presented, high wages alone cannot be expected to bring about significant black employment gains. Whites, too, will be attracted to the same jobs. Moreover, the whites in the Houston area are able to live closer to these large employers and are more attuned to the local labor market information network. Many of the whites who are employed in the blue-collar jobs of the large enterprises that are east of Houston's boundaries live in the adjoining City of Pasadena (located largely within section 27 of figure 3). Blacks, for the most part, must commute miles to work in these jobs. Indicative of the severity of the employment difficulties due to inadequate transportation is the tentative proposal made in early 1970 by officials of the National Alliance of Businessmen in Houston to pool their used fleet cars into a new company "which will charge a disadvantaged employee a price he can afford to use a car" with a rental-purchase plan available also. 38/

37/ "Port of Houston Plays Large Part in Economy," The Houston Post, Feb. 8, 1970, sec. 9, p. 6.

38/ Adine Mehrvin, "Poor Are Willing to Work Rather Than Draw Welfare," The Houston Post, Mar. 1, 1970, sec. 4, p. 7.

THE MEXICAN AMERICANS

Although the mandate of the present study pertains only to black employment patterns, there is a sizable Mexican American population in the city whose presence in the labor force must be taken into account. For this reason, whenever data for this group are available, they are also presented.

It is estimated that the Mexican American population numbered 106,000 (or about 7.1 percent of the population) in the Houston SMSA in 1965. 39/ Although not as heavily concentrated as the black areas, there are several barrios in the city. The Harris County Community Action Agency classified 39,431 Mexican Americans in the county in 1965 as being poor. 40/ This represented 11 percent of the county's poverty population and about 40 percent of the Chicano population. Within the "original CEP area," 17,916 Mexican Americans were listed as being poor (representing 16.9 percent of the area's poverty population).

As mentioned earlier, however, the employment and the unemployment experience of Chicanos is bad but not as pervasive as that of blacks. The Houston experience is similar to the general pattern in Texas communities that have both a black and Chicano population; namely, whichever group is the largest in numbers is the worst off, both absolutely and relatively. 41/ In Houston, blacks exceed Mexican Americans at a ratio of about 3 to 1.

SUMMARY

It is apparent that there are a number of barriers to the advancement of black citizens in Houston. These obstacles contribute to the prevailing black employment patterns and hinder present efforts to alter these insufferable conditions. Pervasive poverty; high unemployment; widespread underemployment; a high public school dropout rate; de facto school segregation; isolated housing in low employment areas; inadequate public transportation; a weak union movement that is generally insensitive to civil rights goals; a political election process that makes it a near impossibility to achieve racially representative public bodies; no public junior colleges; the presence of a second minority group; and the absence of effective community organizations to marshall pressure for change should opportunities be afforded, all contribute to an explanation for the disadvantaged position of the vast majority of Houston's black citizens. When these conditions are superimposed upon a pattern of discriminatory hiring practices, the entire tale will be told.

39/ Don Des Jarlais and Mary Ellen Goodman, "Houstonians of Mexican Ancestry," (Houston: Rice University, Center for Research in Social Changes and Economic Development, 1968), p. 2.

40/ "Dimensions of Poverty," p. 13.

41/ Robert G. Landolt, "The Mexican-American Workers of San Antonio, Texas" (University of Texas, 1965). [This unpublished Ph.D. dissertation actually analyzes six cities other than San Antonio.]

III. SPECIFIC BLACK EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

The analysis of the specific employment patterns of blacks in the Houston labor market is based largely upon data collected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from the annual survey report (EEO-1 Form) of private employers. The most extensive analysis available of these data is for 1966. For 1967 and 1968, only the aggregate occupational data are available. For 1969, data for individual industries have been tabulated and are included. Hence, it is possible to attain some measure of the dynamics of black employment between 1966 and 1969 for the major industries that comprise the Houston SMSA.

With respect to the EEOC data, for the first time the employer reports provide information on employment by sex and race (or ethnic) group on an industry, occupational, and geographic basis. The information has been described as being "generally accurate and a highly useful body of material for the investigation of the employment patterns of minority groups in the United States." 42/

The 1966 data for the Houston SMSA cover approximately 38 percent of the estimated labor force. They include about 40 percent of the SMSA's white workers but only about 23 percent of the blacks. The 1969 data cover 37 percent of the total labor force--39 percent of the white labor force but only 29 percent of the black workers. The wide difference between the racial coverage percentages is itself a comment about employment patterns. The reports cover private firms which employed more than 100 employees for more than 20 weeks in the given year--enterprises where wages are typically higher, working conditions better, and union activity more prevalent. Thus, blacks were concentrated in firms or enterprises not covered by the EEOC reporting requirement--numerous service establishments, nonprofit enterprises, independent workers, and government agencies. Other than government, these sectors usually offer less favorable working conditions than the covered firms.

PRIVATE INDUSTRY

The racial and ethnic distribution of employment in covered industries for Houston for the years 1966-69 is presented in table 9. The paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs is glaring. Although the percentage of blacks increased over the timespan to 4.7 percent, the major advances were in the technician, sales, and clerical categories. The increase in blacks in the technician group is largely explained by developments in the employment of

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42/ Orley Ashenfelter, Minority Employment Patterns, 1966, Report Prepared for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Manpower Policy, Evaluation, and Research of the United States Department of Labor under contract with W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (April 1968), p. 12

TABLE 9. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE FIRMS[1] FOR HOUSTON SMSA BY ETHNIC GROUP, 1966 THROUGH 1969

Occupational group	Total employees, all groups				Percent of employees who were–											
					Anglo				Black				Mexican American			
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1966	1967	1968	1969	1966	1967	1968	1969	1966	1967	1968	1969
Total	248,433	281,380	317,310	312,130	83.3	81.0	80.8	79.4	11.8	13.5	13.5	14.3	4.9	5.5	5.7	6.3
White-collar workers	118,415	145,472	169,742	174,186	96.0	94.4	93.2	91.9	2.0	3.0	3.8	4.7	2.0	2.6	3.0	3.4
Officials and managers	22,029	25,048	28,974	30,107	98.2	98.3	97.7	97.1	.8	.7	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.5
Professionals	21,548	26,148	31,903	33,538	97.5	97.1	96.6	96.4	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.7
Technicians	14,428	15,744	21,409	19,814	91.9	91.5	89.0	87.2	5.1	6.0	6.9	8.5	3.0	3.5	4.1	4.3
Sales workers	17,614	27,556	30,291	33,190	95.6	91.8	90.6	88.8	2.1	4.7	5.5	6.5	2.3	3.5	3.9	4.7
Office and clerical workers	42,796	50,976	57,165	57,537	95.5	93.8	92.1	89.8	1.8	2.9	4.1	5.9	2.7	3.3	3.8	4.3
Blue-collar workers	110,324	116,472	124,694	115,888	71.8	71.0	70.7	67.5	20.7	21.0	20.7	22.9	7.5	8.0	8.6	9.6
Craftsmen	41,024	45,494	51,850	46,249	91.8	89.9	89.3	86.5	4.1	5.4	5.7	7.6	4.1	4.7	5.0	5.9
Operatives	45,385	48,308	50,311	49,307	73.1	67.7	66.1	62.5	18.9	23.9	24.6	27.2	8.0	8.4	9.3	10.3
Laborers	23,915	22,670	22,533	20,332	50.0	40.0	37.6	36.4	40.0	46.2	47.0	47.4	10.0	13.8	15.4	16.2
Service workers	19,694	19,436	22,874	22,056	55.9	41.4	42.4	43.3	35.7	47.0	46.7	43.9	10.4	11.6	10.9	12.8

[1] See text for coverage of the data.

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports.

black women in the medical services industry. In 1969, for example, there were 1,691 black technicians in covered enterprises; of these, 1,137 (or 67 percent) were black women of whom 934 (or 82 percent) were in the medical services. In addition, 74 black men were technicians in medical services. In the sales and clerical occupations, the higher percentages of blacks are largely the result of the movement of black women from hitherto inordinately low occupational levels. Thus between 1966 and 1969, it is clear that while the penetration rate of blacks did increase in white-collar jobs, the occupational distribution of blacks in white-collar jobs altered little. Blacks in white-collar jobs had little participation in managerial, professional, and (outside of medical services) technical occupations.

In the blue-collar ranks, there have been improvements in the occupational distribution of blacks over the 4-year timespan in the covered enterprises. Yet in absolute numbers, black employment in blue-collar jobs decreased from 26,872 in 1966 to 26,562 in 1969--or by 310 jobs. The reduction reflects a significant decline in blue-collar job opportunities in the covered enterprises over the time period. Although it is encouraging to find that blacks were able to hold a higher percentage of their jobs than were Angloes during the contraction, it is disheartening to find fewer job opportunities in the sector that employs most of the blacks (59 percent of all blacks covered by the data in 1969) in 1969 than 1966. Thus, it is apparent that blacks have made their largest percentage gains in declining occupational categories in the Houston economy. In a quantitative sense, the growing black labor force found less opportunity in the blue-collar ranks in 1969 than in 1966.

It was in the low-paying service worker category that the greatest percentage gains for blacks were made over the 3-year period. Unlike the blue-collar gains, the change in the service sector was in both absolute and relative terms.

Thus, in general, although black penetration of the large industries increased between 1966 and 1969, there was little progress toward altering the basic occupational position of blacks. In 1969--as earlier--blacks were overly represented in the less skilled and lowest paying occupations that afford scant chance for promotion.

Examination of the distribution of occupations by race or ethnic group confirms the pattern. In 1966, nearly half (49 percent) of black women were in service occupations and 89 percent of black men were employed as operatives, laborers, and service workers (see table 10). By 1969, the concentration of blacks in these categories showed improvement but still remained inordinately high (see table 11). In 1969, 41 percent of all black women were employed as service workers and 79 percent of all black men were employed as operatives, laborers, and service workers. The only white-collar occupation to sustain any significant gains for black women over the 3 years was the low wage clerical area. The professional and

TABLE 10. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNIC GROUP AND SEX FOR HOUSTON SMSA, 1966

[Percent distribution]

Occupational group	Both sexes				Male				Female			
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American
Officials and managers	9	10	1	2	11	11	1	3	2	2	1	1
Professionals	9	10	1	2	10	10	([1])	3	4	4	5	4
Technicians	6	6	3	4	6	6	1	4	5	5	10	5
Sales workers	7	8	1	3	7	7	1	3	10	11	3	6
Office and clerical workers	17	20	3	10	7	7	2	4	51	57	7	24
Craftsmen	17	18	6	14	21	21	7	17	1	1	1	3
Operatives	18	16	29	30	21	21	33	30	8	7	14	23
Laborers	10	6	33	20	11	11	38	22	3	2	10	9
Service workers	8	5	24	17	6	6	18	13	14	10	49	25
Total: Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	248,433	206,980	29,263	12,190	191,502	158,605	23,741	9,156	56,931	48,375	5,522	3,034

[1] Less than 1/2 of 1 percent.

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

TABLE 11. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNIC GROUP AND SEX FOR HOUSTON SMSA, 1969

[Percent distribution]

Occupational group	Both sexes				Male				Female			
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American	All groups	Anglo	Black	Mexican American
Officials and managers	10	12	1	2	12	15	1	3	2	3	1	1
Professionals	11	13	1	3	12	15	1	3	6	7	3	3
Technicians	6	7	4	4	7	8	2	4	5	4	9	5
Sales workers	11	12	5	8	9	10	4	6	16	17	8	12
Office and clerical workers	18	21	8	12	7	8	4	5	48	56	18	32
Craftsmen	15	16	8	14	20	22	10	18	1	1	2	2
Operatives	17	12	30	26	20	16	38	30	6	4	11	14
Laborers	6	3	22	17	8	4	27	20	3	1	9	8
Service workers	7	4	22	14	5	3	14	11	13	7	41	24
Total: Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	312,130	247,801	44,517	19,812	225,428	179,247	31,853	14,328	86,702	68,554	12,664	5,484

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

technical occupations actually had percentage declines in employment for black women. For black men, there was virtually no change in the percentage holding white-collar positions between 1966 and 1969. The only substantive advances were made in the operative and craftsmen classifications.

Still another measure of the occupational concentration of the different racial groups affirms these patterns. This is an index calculated by multiplying the proportion of each group's employment in the nine standard occupational categories by the average earnings for that occupation for all racial groups and then summing the results for all occupations (see table 12). The result is that:

> The index is ... expressed in dollars and may be interpreted as the average salary for a particular minority group if its members had the same earnings in each occupation as the total population. Differences in the indexes for different groups are thus due solely to differences in occupational distributions and are nothing more than measures of the average money value of the occupational distributions for each group .... These indexes reflect differences in gross occupational standing as judged on the basis of only nine occupational categories and are undoubtedly underestimates of total occupational differences. 43/

Hence, the difference in the money value of the Houston index for black men ($3,718) and that for Anglo men ($5,239) reflects both the clustering of blacks in the occupations with the lowest annual earnings and the dominance of Angloes in the higher paying occupations. In relative terms, the Houston index of occupational position for black men is only 71 percent of that for Anglo men. Of the four non-Anglo groupings, blacks occupy the worst position among both men and women, although the other groups are substantially below those for Angloes except in the case of Orientals who comprise less than 1 percent of Houston's population. Moreover, blacks are in worse position in Houston than they are on a nationwide basis. Houston blacks are also in lower relative position than elsewhere in the South, despite their slightly higher absolute position. Unfortunately, indexes of occupational data for subsequent years are unavailable as the data have never been processed.

The overall pattern is replicated in virtually all of the 10 largest employment industries covered by the EEOC survey. In 1966 these industries accounted for 53 percent of the total covered employment and 45 percent of all blacks covered by the survey; in 1969, the 10 largest employed 52 percent of all employees covered by the survey and 48 percent of all blacks. The individual racial and ethnic employment patterns for these 10 largest employment industries are presented in table 13 for 1966 and table 14 for 1969.

43/ Ibid. p. 16 (emphasis is supplied).

[Anglo = 100.0]

Ethnic grouping by sex	United States		South			Houston SMSA		
	Index	Percent of Anglo	Index	Percent of Anglo	Ratio of index to U.S. index	Index	Percent of Anglo	Ratio of index to U.S. index
Male:								
Black	$3,883	77.4	$3,707	73.9	0.95	$3,718	71.0	0.96
Oriental	5,079	101.3	5,637	112.4	1.11	5,258	100.4	1.04
American Indian	4,472	89.2	4,638	92.5	1.04	5,207	99.4	1.16
Spanish American	4,168	83.1	4,242	84.6	1.02	4,239	80.9	1.02
Anglo	5,016	100.0	5,013	100.0	1.00	5,239	100.0	1.04
Female:								
Black	2,165	84.7	2,035	80.4	.94	2,061	76.8	.95
Oriental	2,682	105.0	2,821	111.4	1.05	3,124	116.5	1.16
American Indian	2,284	89.4	2,392	94.5	1.05	2,765	103.1	1.21
Spanish American	2,231	87.3	2,250	88.9	1.01	2,232	83.2	1.00
Anglo	2,555	100.0	2,532	100.0	.99	2,682	100.0	1.05

[1] The indexes are the mean average salary which the individual group would have recorded if its members had the same earnings in each occupation as the total population. Differences, accordingly, reflect solely the differences in occupational distributions.

Source: Orley Ashenfelter, "Minority Employment Patterns, 1966," report prepared for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Department of Labor (April, 1968), p. 2 (mimeographed).

TABLE 13. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1966

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees						Percent of employees					
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental
Chemical industry												
Managers	2,878	2,855	6	11	4	2	100.0	99.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1
Professional	2,244	2,221	1	17	2	3	100.0	98.9	.04	.7	.1	.1
Technical	1,477	1,435	22	17	2	1	100.0	97.2	1.5	1.1	.1	.1
Sales	445	438	0	7	0	0	100.0	98.4	0	1.6	0	0
Clerical	1,947	1,900	23	22	1	1	100.0	97.6	1.2	1.1	.02	.03
Craftsmen	4,704	4,595	83	20	6	0	100.0	97.7	1.8	.4	.1	0
Operatives	5,508	4,962	453	90	2	1	100.0	90.1	8.2	1.6	.04	.03
Laborers	842	335	448	59	0	0	100.0	39.8	53.2	7.0	0	0
Services	446	312	124	10	0	0	100.0	70.0	27.8	2.2	0	0
Total	20,491	19,053	1,160	253	17	8	100.0	93.0	5.7	1.2	.1	.03
Machinery (nonelectrical) industry												
Managers	1,496	1,478	2	11	4	1	100.0	98.8	.1	.7	.3	.1
Professional	873	867	1	2	1	2	100.0	99.3	.1	.2	.1	.2
Technical	953	935	2	16	0	0	100.0	98.1	.2	1.6	0	0
Sales	1,266	1,261	1	4	0	0	100.0	99.6	.1	.4	0	0
Clerical	2,553	2,489	22	36	3	3	100.0	97.5	.9	1.5	.1	.1
Craftsmen	5,188	4,879	140	164	5	0	100.0	94.0	2.7	3.2	.1	0
Operatives	4,920	3,823	852	237	4	4	100.0	77.7	17.3	4.8	.1	.1
Laborers	1,151	551	508	92	0	0	100.0	47.9	44.2	7.9	0	0
Services	162	90	62	10	0	0	100.0	55.6	38.2	6.2	0	0
Total	18,562	16,373	1,590	572	17	10	100.0	88.2	8.6	3.1	1	.04
Liquid hydrocarbon industry												
Managers	1,552	1,544	0	7	1	0	100.0	99.5	0	.5	.01	0
Professional	3,614	3,577	2	23	2	10	100.0	99.0	.1	.6	.1	.3
Technical	1,574	1,528	9	34	1	2	100.0	97.1	.6	2.2	.1	.1
Sales	103	92	10	0	0	1	100.0	89.3	9.7	0	0	1.0
Clerical	3,705	3,638	40	23	2	2	100.0	98.2	1.1	.6	.1	.1
Craftsmen	1,056	1,044	2	9	1	0	100.0	98.9	.2	.8	.1	0
Operatives	1,765	1,630	62	67	6	0	100.0	92.4	3.5	3.8	.3	0
Laborers	789	641	50	105	0	2	100.0	80.3	6.3	13.1	0	.3
Services	157	76	74	7	0	0	100.0	48.4	47.1	4.4	0	0
Total	14,324	13,770	249	275	13	17	100.0	96.1	1.7	1.9	.1	.2

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 13. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1966—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees						Percent of employees					
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental
Petroleum refining industry												
Managers	1,641	1,639	1	0	1	0	100.0	99.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Professional	1,977	1,959	2	12	1	3	100.0	99.1	.1	.6	.1	.2
Technical	678	661	9	7	1	0	100.0	97.5	1.3	1.1	.1	0
Sales	99	98	0	1	0	0	100.0	99.0	0	1.0	0	0
Clerical	2,746	2,693	23	23	6	1	100.0	98.1	.8	.8	.2	.1
Craftsmen	3,550	3,452	58	39	1	0	100.0	97.2	1.6	1.1	.1	0
Operatives	1,612	1,179	391	41	0	1	100.0	73.1	24.3	2.5	0	.1
Laborers	374	55	268	51	0	0	100.0	14.7	71.7	13.6	0	0
Services	411	265	124	21	1	0	100.0	64.5	30.2	5.1	.2	0
Total	13,088	12,001	876	195	11	5	100.0	91.7	6.7	1.5	.1	.002
Wholesale trade industry												
Managers	1,346	1,330	2	9	3	2	100.0	98.8	.2	.5	.2	.2
Professional	610	600	3	5	2	0	100.0	98.3	.5	.8	.3	0
Technical	634	622	6	5	1	0	100.0	98.0	1.0	.9	.1	0
Sales	2,284	2,248	13	17	1	5	100.0	98.4	.6	.7	.04	.2
Clerical	3,300	3,109	58	117	4	12	100.0	94.2	1.8	3.5	.1	.4
Craftsmen	1,548	1,126	252	163	6	1	100.0	72.7	16.3	10.5	.4	.1
Operatives	2,273	1,520	555	196	1	1	100.0	66.9	24.4	8.6	.1	.1
Laborers	772	352	361	59	0	0	100.0	45.6	46.8	7.7	0	0
Services	117	45	65	7	0	0	100.0	38.5	55.6	5.9	0	0
Total	12,884	10,952	1,315	578	18	21	100.0	85.0	10.2	4.5	.1	.2
Retail trade (general merchandise) industry												
Managers	1,247	1,213	7	23	2	2	100.0	97.3	.6	1.8	.2	.2
Professional	54	51	0	2	0	1	100.0	94.4	0	3.7	0	1.9
Technical	88	82	0	6	0	0	100.0	93.2	0	6.8	0	0
Sales	5,602	5,215	169	189	28	1	100.0	93.1	3.0	3.4	.5	.1
Clerical	2,257	2,078	67	108	3	1	100.0	92.1	3.0	4.8	.1	.1
Craftsmen	544	416	27	99	2	0	100.0	76.5	5.0	18.2	.3	0
Operatives	737	468	181	36	1	1	100.0	63.5	24.6	11.7	.1	.1
Laborers	594	298	224	70	2	0	100.0	50.2	37.7	11.8	.3	0
Services	1,049	411	607	31	0	0	100.0	39.2	57.9	2.9	0	0
Total	12,172	10,232	1,282	614	38	6	100.0	85.1	10.5	5.0	.3	.001

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 13. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1966—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees						Percent of employees					
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental
Building construction industry												
Managers	698	688	7	1	2	0	100.0	98.6	1.0	0.1	0.3	0.0
Professional	772	755	2	6	1	8	100.0	97.8	.3	.8	.1	1.1
Technical	630	572	0	42	0	16	100.0	90.8	0	6.7	0	2.5
Sales	10	10	0	0	0	0	100.0	100.0	0	0	0	0
Clerical	924	907	0	15	2	0	100.0	98.0	0	1.6	.2	0
Craftsmen	3,508	3,340	54	110	3	1	100.0	95.2	1.5	3.0	.2	.1
Operatives	2,095	1,827	83	182	3	0	100.0	87.2	4.0	8.7	.1	0
Laborers	2,096	1,606	268	218	4	0	100.0	76.6	12.8	10.4	.2	0
Services	201	181	2	18	0	0	100.0	90.0	.1	9.9	0	0
Total	10,934	9,886	416	592	15	25	100.0	90.4	3.8	5.4	.1	.2
Medical services industry												
Managers	470	424	19	10	12	5	100.0	90.2	4.0	2.1	2.6	1.1
Professional	1,853	1,418	238	39	37	71	100.0	76.5	15.5	2.1	2.0	3.8
Technical	2,347	1,677	456	165	28	21	100.0	71.5	19.4	7.0	1.1	.9
Sales	6	4	2	0	0	0	100.0	66.7	33.3	0	0	0
Clerical	1,445	1,159	114	139	29	4	100.0	80.2	7.9	9.6	2.0	.3
Craftsmen	205	174	28	3	0	0	100.0	84.9	13.7	1.4	0	0
Operatives	1,161	623	380	154	4	0	100.0	53.7	32.7	13.3	.3	0
Laborers	648	106	434	87	21	0	100.0	16.4	67.0	13.4	3.2	0
Services	2,383	659	1,442	274	2	6	100.0	27.7	60.5	11.5	.1	.2
Total	10,518	6,244	3,163	871	133	107	100.0	59.4	30.1	8.3	1.2	1.0
Fabricated metals (not ordered or transported) industry												
Managers	736	722	4	6	1	3	100.0	98.1	.5	.8	.1	.4
Professional	180	177	0	1	0	2	100.0	98.3	0	.5	0	1.2
Technical	491	463	2	23	0	3	100.0	94.3	.4	4.8	0	.5
Sales	255	255	0	0	0	0	100.0	100.0	0	0	0	0
Clerical	991	969	7	14	1	0	100.0	97.8	.7	1.4	.1	0
Craftsmen	2,259	2,074	81	102	2	0	100.0	91.8	3.6	4.5	.1	0
Operatives	3,330	2,384	602	340	4	0	100.0	71.6	18.1	10.2	.1	0
Laborers	1,437	786	504	147	0	0	100.0	54.7	35.1	10.2	0	0
Services	93	52	37	4	0	0	100.0	55.9	39.8	4.3	0	0
Total	9,772	7,882	1,237	637	8	8	100.0	80.7	12.7	6.5	.1	.1

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 13. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1966—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees						Percent of employees					
	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental	All groups	Anglo	Black	Spanish surname	American Indian	Oriental
Food and kindred products industry												
Managers	850	814	15	16	2	3	100.0	95.8	1.8	1.9	0.2	0.3
Professional	162	159	1	2	0	0	100.0	98.2	.6	1.2	0	0
Technical	150	114	24	12	0	0	100.0	76.0	16.0	8.0	0	0
Sales	1,534	1,398	93	40	3	0	100.0	91.1	6.1	2.6	.2	0
Clerical	794	761	13	18	0	2	100.0	95.8	1.6	2.3	0	.3
Craftsmen	998	780	138	77	0	3	100.0	78.1	13.8	7.7	0	.3
Operatives	2,360	1,411	652	293	3	1	100.0	59.8	27.6	12.4	.2	.1
Laborers	2,101	812	1,009	280	0	0	100.0	38.7	48.0	13.3	0	0
Services	221	111	104	6	0	0	100.0	50.2	47.1	2.7	0	0
Total	9,170	6,360	2,049	744	8	9	100.0	69.4	22.3	8.1	.1	.1

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

TABLE 14. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1969

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees					Percent of employees				
	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental
Chemical industry										
Managers	3,387	3,347	16	24	0	100.0	98.8	0.5	0.7	0.0
Professional	2,861	2,781	16	47	17	100.0	97.2	.6	1.6	.6
Technical	1,821	1,747	43	29	2	100.0	95.9	2.4	1.6	.1
Sales	584	578	3	3	0	100.0	99.0	.5	.5	0
Clerical	2,501	2,389	60	49	3	100.0	95.5	2.4	2.0	.1
Craftsmen	4,329	4,094	142	93	0	100.0	94.6	3.3	2.1	0
Operatives	6,384	5,491	658	233	2	100.0	86.0	10.3	3.6	0
Laborers	880	390	369	121	0	100.0	44.3	41.9	13.7	0
Services	450	322	94	34	0	100.0	71.6	20.9	7.6	0
Total	23,197	21,139	1,401	633	24	100.0	91.1	6.0	2.7	.1
Machinery (nonelectrical) industry										
Managers	1,561	1,535	18	7	1	100.0	98.3	1.2	.4	.1
Professional	1,498	1,450	24	18	6	100.0	96.8	1.6	1.2	.4
Technical	1,217	1,146	26	44	1	100.0	94.2	2.1	3.6	.1
Sales	871	864	0	7	0	100.0	99.2	0	.8	0
Clerical	2,150	2,042	60	47	1	100.0	95.0	2.8	2.2	0
Craftsmen	5,032	4,346	425	258	1	100.0	86.4	8.4	5.1	0
Operatives	3,990	2,608	944	438	0	100.0	65.4	23.7	11.0	0
Laborers	1,415	676	632	107	0	100.0	47.8	44.7	7.6	0
Services	182	79	88	15	0	100.0	43.4	48.4	8.2	0
Total	17,916	14,748	2,217	941	10	100.0	82.3	12.4	5.3	.1
Liquid hydrocarbon industry										
Managers	1,645	1,635	3	6	1	100.0	99.4	.2	.4	.1
Professional	2,671	2,626	16	21	8	100.0	98.3	.6	.8	.3
Technical	1,534	1,434	47	43	10	100.0	93.5	3.1	2.8	.7
Sales	189	186	2	1	0	100.0	98.4	1.1	.5	0
Clerical	2,766	2,553	133	75	5	100.0	92.3	4.8	2.7	.2
Craftsmen	1,840	1,727	63	50	0	100.0	93.9	3.4	2.7	0
Operatives	1,821	1,533	213	73	2	100.0	84.2	11.7	4.0	.1
Laborers	587	394	79	113	1	100.0	67.1	13.5	19.3	.2
Services	160	43	103	13	1	100.0	26.9	64.4	8.1	.6
Total	13,213	12,131	659	395	28	100.0	91.8	5.0	3.0	.2

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 14. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDISTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1969—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees					Percent of employees				
	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental
Petroleum refining industry										
Managers	2,351	2,343	4	4	0	100.0	99.7	0.2	0.2	0.0
Professional	4,893	4,769	47	42	35	100.0	97.5	1.0	.9	.7
Technical	1,311	1,233	42	36	0	100.0	94.1	3.2	2.7	0
Sales	158	153	3	2	0	100.0	96.8	1.9	1.3	0
Clerical	4,179	3,788	234	149	8	100.0	90.6	5.6	3.6	.2
Craftsmen	3,737	3,547	122	68	0	100.0	94.9	3.3	1.8	0
Operatives	1,208	953	191	64	0	100.0	78.9	15.8	5.3	0
Laborers	331	141	144	46	0	100.0	42.6	43.5	13.9	0
Services	199	133	55	11	0	100.0	66.8	27.6	5.5	0
Total	18,367	17,060	842	422	43	100.0	92.9	4.6	2.3	.2
Wholesale trade industry										
Managers	2,457	2,408	15	28	6	100.0	98.0	.6	1.1	.2
Professional	1,393	1,367	7	14	5	100.0	98.1	.5	1.0	.4
Technical	1,137	1,067	38	31	1	100.0	93.8	3.3	2.7	.1
Sales	3,056	2,968	36	41	11	100.0	97.1	1.2	1.3	.4
Clerical	4,995	4,640	189	153	13	100.0	92.9	3.8	3.1	.3
Craftsmen	2,492	1,851	425	214	2	100.0	74.3	17.1	8.6	.1
Operatives	3,466	1,861	1,291	306	8	100.0	53.7	37.2	8.8	.2
Laborers	1,178	382	573	223	0	100.0	32.4	48.6	18.9	0
Services	343	242	73	20	8	100.0	70.6	21.3	5.8	2.3
Total	20,517	16,786	2,647	1,030	54	100.0	81.8	12.9	5.0	.3
Retail trade (general merchandise) industry										
Managers	1,845	1,740	50	54	1	100.0	94.3	2.7	2.9	.1
Professional	61	56	2	1	2	100.0	91.8	3.3	1.6	3.3
Technical	137	113	8	16	0	100.0	82.5	5.8	11.7	0
Sales	8,837	7,791	615	425	6	100.0	88.2	7.0	4.8	.1
Clerical	3,571	3,016	270	283	2	100.0	84.5	7.6	7.9	.1
Craftsmen	736	523	67	144	2	100.0	71.1	9.1	19.6	.3
Operatives	939	536	287	107	9	100.0	57.1	30.6	11.4	1.0
Laborers	794	387	280	127	0	100.0	48.7	35.3	16.0	0
Services	1,634	738	730	164	2	100.0	45.2	44.7	10.0	.1
Total	18,554	14,900	2,309	1,321	24	100.0	80.3	12.4	7.1	.1

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 14. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1969—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees					Percent of employees				
	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental
Electric, gas, and sanitary service industry										
Managers	1,161	1,149	7	4	1	100.0	99.0	0.6	0.3	0.1
Professional	1,283	1,262	7	12	2	100.0	98.4	.5	.9	.2
Technical	858	828	8	21	1	100.0	96.5	.9	2.4	.1
Sales	235	227	4	4	0	100.0	96.6	1.7	1.7	0
Clerical	2,598	2,391	130	75	2	100.0	92.0	5.0	2.9	.1
Craftsmen	2,904	2,832	46	26	0	100.0	97.5	1.6	.9	0
Operatives	1,694	1,328	312	54	0	100.0	75.4	18.4	3.2	0
Laborers	410	108	264	38	0	100.0	26.3	64.4	9.3	0
Services	108	36	70	2	0	100.0	33.3	64.8	1.9	0
Total	11,251	10,161	848	236	6	100.0	90.3	7.5	2.1	.1
Medical services industry										
Managers	698	642	33	12	11	100.0	92.0	4.7	1.7	1.6
Professional	3,804	3,264	267	127	146	100.0	85.8	7.0	3.3	3.8
Technical	3,114	1,791	1,008	290	25	100.0	57.5	32.4	9.3	.8
Sales	12	4	6	2	0	100.0	33.3	50.0	16.7	0
Clerical	2,968	2,377	381	204	6	100.0	80.1	12.8	6.9	.2
Craftsmen	311	221	71	19	0	100.0	71.1	22.8	6.1	0
Operatives	817	323	422	71	1	100.0	39.5	51.7	8.7	.1
Laborers	324	75	236	13	0	100.0	23.1	72.8	4.0	0
Services	5,767	1,914	3,412	437	4	100.0	33.2	59.2	7.6	.1
Total	17,815	10,611	5,836	1,175	193	100.0	59.6	32.8	6.6	1.1
Food and kindred products industry										
Managers	1,178	1,117	42	18	1	100.0	94.8	3.6	1.5	.1
Professional	332	327	3	2	0	100.0	98.5	.9	.6	0
Technical	212	174	24	14	0	100.0	82.1	11.3	6.6	0
Sales	1,754	1,557	94	98	5	100.0	88.8	5.4	5.6	.3
Clerical	1,116	1,024	40	47	5	100.0	91.8	3.6	4.2	.4
Craftsmen	1,253	949	189	115	0	100.0	75.7	15.1	9.2	0
Operatives	2,909	1,377	1,127	405	0	100.0	47.3	38.7	13.9	0
Laborers	2,204	737	1,036	430	1	100.0	33.4	47.0	19.5	0
Services	269	128	127	14	0	100.0	47.6	47.2	5.2	0
Total	11,227	7,390	2,682	1,143	12	100.0	65.8	23.9	10.2	.1

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 14. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 10 LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1969—Continued

Industry and occupational group	Number of employees					Percent of employees				
	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental	All groups	Anglo[1]	Black	Spanish surname	Oriental
Fabricated metals (not ordered or transported) industry										
Managers	826	804	10	12	0	100.0	97.3	1.2	1.5	0.0
Professional	177	172	1	3	1	100.0	97.2	.6	1.7	.6
Technical	406	364	8	34	0	100.0	89.7	2.0	8.4	0
Sales	394	392	0	1	1	100.0	99.5	0	.3	.3
Clerical	1,038	1,000	21	16	1	100.0	96.3	2.0	1.5	.1
Craftsmen	2,460	2,051	163	246	0	100.0	83.4	6.6	10.0	0
Operatives	3,435	1,906	975	554	0	100.0	55.5	28.9	16.1	0
Laborers	1,056	383	496	177	0	100.0	36.3	47.0	16.8	0
Services	64	26	32	6	0	100.0	40.6	50.0	9.4	0
Total	9,856	7,098	1,706	1,049	3	100.0	72.0	17.3	10.6	0

[1] In this table *only*, the figures for American Indians are included in the Anglo category.

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

In both 1966 and 1969, the largest of the employment-generating industries in Houston covered by the EEOC data was the chemical industry. Over the 3-year timespan, the percentage of jobs held by blacks increased by 0.3 percent--to 6.0 percent. Of the 1,160 jobs held by blacks in 1966, 88 percent were in the operative, laborer, and service categories; by 1969, 80 percent of the blacks in the industry were in those classifications. Only 138 blacks held white-collar jobs (which was 1.2 percent of total white-collar positions). The picture for black women has remained bleak. In 1966, the industry employed 1,483 women--only 35 of whom were black; in 1969, there were 2,041 female employees--76 were black. Thus, black women accounted for only 3.7 percent of the jobs held by women in the industry. Moreover, 48 percent of the black women were clerical workers.

Nationwide, the chemical industry has experienced accelerated growth in production, increasing employment opportunities (although rising more slowly than output) and a declining proportion of black employees in its work force. 44/ The percentage of blacks in the industry was 9 percent in 1940 but only 6 percent in 1968. The explanation for the national decline has been the rapidly changing composition of employment from blue-collar jobs (where blacks dominate) to white-collar jobs (where blacks are few). The Houston experience is consistent with this pattern. The second largest occupational category is skilled craftsmen. This is the one blue-collar sector that is less sensitive to technological change. Yet, the chemical industry is noted for its practice of hiring craftsmen in the open market rather than training its own. 45/ In most instances, the craftsmen are bid away from the construction industry. As blacks in Houston have had great difficulty attaining journeyman status in the building craft unions, they have had little opportunity to become craftsmen in the chemical industry. As matters now stand, the industry affords little prospect for providing employment for Houston's minority work force. The only possible exception could be in the sizable clerical area, which in 1969 employed 2,501 people. As many of these jobs are not highly skilled, changes in hiring policies could offer numerically significant opportunities for blacks in the future. Otherwise, unless extensive efforts are made to prepare non-Angloes for other white-collar jobs, the largest private employing industry in the city will become more of an Anglo preserve than it already is.

Machinery manufacturing (nonelectrical) was second in size of covered industry in 1966 (fifth in 1969). In 1966, blacks comprised 8.6 percent of the industry's labor force; by 1969, the percentage had risen to 12.4 percent. Although the percentage increase manifested itself in every job category (except sales, which had no black representation in 1969), blacks still held only 1.8 percent of the white-collar jobs in the industry. The most significant racial employment pattern remained unaltered--the virtual absence of black women. In 1966, there were a mere five black women (as opposed to 1,680 Anglo women); by 1969, there were 47 black women (as opposed

44/ William Howard Quay, Jr., The Negro in the Chemical Industry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) chapters II and III.

45/ Ibid. p. 39-41.

to 1,607 Anglo women). Thus, black women totaled only 2.8 percent of female employment in 1969. For black males, 91.4 percent were to be found in the blue-collar occupations.

A large industry that is relatively unique to the Houston labor market is the liquid hydrocarbon industry, which extracts products from natural gas. In 1966, this industry ranked third in covered employment with 14,324 employees; only 249 (or 1.7 percent) were black. Thirteen of the blacks were women; 2,620 of the Angloes were women. Of the black men, 187 (or 79.2 percent) were employed in the blue-collar and service occupations. By 1969, the industry was the seventh largest covered employer. The number of black employees had risen to 659 (or 5.0 percent). The figures for black women rose to 114--or 4.8 percent of the total female labor force. Eighty-three of the black women were clerical employees. As for black men, 79.4 percent (a slight increase) were employed in the blue-collar and service categories. There were, however, important advances for black men in the professional and technical occupations between 1966 and 1969.

Another major industry uncommon to most urban areas but of major importance in Houston business is petroleum. But, as with the chemical industry, it, too, is undergoing a marked technological transformation which is altering its occupational structure. Blue-collar jobs are becoming a smaller proportion of total employment while white-collar occupations are increasing. Unlike the chemical industry, however, total employment in the industry is rapidly declining. Nationwide, employment in petroleum refining fell by 20 percent between 1950 and 1966. Still, it is reported that the industry is "overstaffed," keeping many employees on its rosters only because of "paternalistic attitudes."46/ Prior to 1940, blacks were hired in the industry only in unskilled job classifications. Subsequently, a system of formally segregated unions solidified the racial nature of the job structure. By the 1950's, when Federal Government pressure brought an end to those overtly exclusionary practices, employment in the blue-collar ranks had begun its secular decline. The blacks in the industry were hired for their ability to do laborer work, not for their potential for promotion. Hence, they have had difficulty being upgraded to less technologically vulnerable jobs.47/ A nationwide

46/ Carl B. King, The Negro in the Petroleum Industry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 10-11.

47/ Ibid., chapters IV and V.

study of black employment in the petroleum industry revealed that in 1968, blacks comprised a mere 3.9 percent of the work force. 48/ In Houston, on the other hand, blacks held 6.7 percent of the jobs in 1966; by 1969, however, the percentage of jobs held by blacks had declined to 4.6 percent. Despite the fact that petroleum was the fourth largest covered employer in Houston in both 1966 and 1969, the number of black employees declined from 876 to 842 workers. The decline is not explained by the general decline in industry employment because in Houston, covered employment increased over these 4 years from 13,088 employees to 18,367 (a sharp rise of 40 percent). The explanation rests with the fact that Houston is the corporate headquarters of a number of major refineries (e.g., Humble Oil, Atlantic Richfield, and Gulf Oil) whose white-collar employees have been increasing. In addition, the Shell Oil Company is in the process of moving its corporate headquarters from New York City to Houston. It is obvious, however, that blacks have not participated in either the past or the present in the industry's hiring activities. In 1966, only 17 black women were employed (compared to 1,810 Anglo women); by 1969, there were 186 black women (compared to 2,910 Anglo women). Of the 186, 167 were in clerical classifications. For black males, 77.6 percent were employed in 1969 in the declining blue-collar and service occupations.

Having a large and growing urban population as well as being a regional manufacturing and transportation center, it is logical to expect wholesale trade to be a significant source of employment for Houston. In 1966, it was the fifth largest employment source of the industries covered by the EEOC data. By 1969, it had advanced to second place. Black employment edged upward from 10.2 percent to 12.9 percent over the elapsed interval. Yet again, black women found little chance for employment. In 1966, only 39 of the 2,276 female employees were black; by 1969, 160 of the 4,006 female employees were black (a change from 1.7 to 3.9 percent). Sales and clerical jobs dominate the industry's job structure; yet blacks held a scant 13 and 58 of these respective positions in 1966; in 1969, their numbers had risen to 36 and 189, respectively.

With a rapidly growing sales market, it is of no surprise that the retail trade sector is an important source of employment in Houston. In terms of covered employment, retail trade moved from sixth to third in size between 1966 and 1969. Black employment rose from 10.5 percent to 12.4 percent of total employment. As was true of the wholesale sector, the dominant occupations are in sales and clerical work. Indeed, approximately 65 percent of the jobs in the industry are in these two white-collar occupations. Yet in 1966, blacks represented only 3.7 percent of the employees in these combined classifications; by 1969, the percentage was 7.1. Although there have been marked overall improvements, black participation remains far below its percentage of the population of the city. In addition, a closer examination of the job structure reveals less

48/ Ibid.

favorable developments. Looking more closely at the largest occupational category--sales workers (accounting in 1969 for 47.6 percent of total employment), blacks in 1969 held 7.0 percent of these "visible" jobs which involve direct contact with the buying public. Although the 1969 figure is an improvement over the 3.0 percent of 1966, it is far from being truly representative of a city whose buying public is 25-percent black. In many instances, sales jobs have minimal qualifications so that the paucity of blacks cannot be explained on the basis of lack of qualifications. Over one-third of black women in the industry were employed as service workers in the industry (as opposed to only 4.8 percent of Anglo women). With regard to black men, 76.4 percent were employed in 1969 in the blue-collar and service sectors of the industry.

Houston's rapid growth has greatly stimulated the building industry. In 1967, it is reported that the dollar value of issued building permits for all forms of construction totaled $412 million.49/ This figure was exceeded that year by only two other cities in the Nation--New York and Los Angeles.50/ As in most metropolitan areas, the construction industry is divided into a commercial and industrial sector and a residential sector. The former, typically composed of large enterprises, is generally unionized and engaged in specialized construction projects for government and business. The residential sector is usually made up of smaller firms, which in Houston are almost totally nonunion and which concentrate on home-building and remodeling. For the most part, it is the commercial contractors who are covered by the EEOC data. Thus, the actual employment in the industry is seriously understated by these data. In 1966, the building industry ranked seventh in covered employment; in 1969, it was not among the top 10 (and is therefore omitted from table 14). In 1966, as shown earlier in table 13, only 416 blacks (415 of whom were males) were employed by the covered employers. The industry is one in which the occupational structure is extensively blue collar. In the white-collar jobs, the racial experience has been the most unequal. For while 30 percent of the Angloes employed in the industry were employed in the white-collar positions, only 2 percent of the blacks held such jobs. Thus, 98 percent of the blacks in the industry were employed in the blue-collar occupational classifications as opposed to 70 percent of the Angloes. Blacks represented less than 4 percent of total employment with 64 percent of the blacks employed as laborers. Although there are few reliable statistics available on the residential sector, it does provide employment for a large number of blacks. For example, the 1960 population census reported 5,948 blacks in the construction industry in the Houston SMSA or 18 percent of the industry's total employment. Almost 55 percent of the blacks, however, were employed as laborers. As so few blacks are accounted for in the EEOC

49/ Houston: Facts and Figures (Houston: Texas Commerce Bank, 1969), p. 8.

50/ Ibid.

survey of the large contractors, it can safely be assumed that the preponderance of opportunities for blacks in the building industry is in the residential sector. The fact that much of the residential work is done on the outer perimeters of the city imposes difficulties to greater black participation. Building sites are becoming increasingly more distant from the black population clusters, and public transportation is seldom available to these new areas.

The medical facilities for education, research, and patient care in Houston are superior. The center of these activities is the Texas Medical Center. Sixteen different institutions and 14 medical organizations have joined together to form this complex which has attained international prominence. There are 50 hospitals with a combined total of over 9,500 beds. Existing plans call for an additional 1,600 beds to be added between 1969 and 1974. There are also numerous clinics and convalescent homes in the city. The employment needs of this sector are rapidly increasing, and it has become a primary target for the Federal manpower programs. In 1966, medical services stood eighth in the list of major employers covered by the EEOC survey. By 1969, it ranked sixth. In the interim, the percentage of black employment increased slightly from 30.1 percent to 32.8 percent. Thus, it is apparent that in both periods, the industry has been a significant source of employment for blacks. In sharp contrast to all of the other industries mentioned to this point, medical services is dominated by female workers. Of all employees included in the 1966 figures, 77 percent were women; in 1969, it was 79 percent. In 1966, 29 percent of the female workers were black; in 1969, 33 percent. Most blacks, however, are employed in the blue-collar and service worker categories. In 1966, 72 percent of all black employees were in these occupations; by 1969, the figure was 71 percent.

Another large manufacturing industry in Houston is the fabricated metals industry. Standing ninth in 1966, it was 10th in 1969 in employment size for covered enterprises. In 1966, blacks held 12.7 percent of the jobs with over 98.7 percent of the black employees in the blue-collar and service categories. In 1966, there were only 22 black women employed (compared to 824 Anglo women). As of 1969, overall black employment had risen to 17.3 percent of the industry total, but the occupational distribution of blacks was virtually unaltered. That is to say, 97.7 percent of black employees in 1969 were employed in nonwhite-collar jobs. As for black women, their numbers increased to 116 by 1969 with the operative category employing 105 of them.

Because of Houston's proximity to the large agricultural areas of east Texas and the fact that the city is a transportation hub, the food and kindred products industry was the 10th largest employer in 1966 and ninth in 1969. Blacks composed 22.3 percent of the work force in 1966 and 23.9 percent in 1969. With respect to occupational distribution, there was little change over the 4-year period. In 1966, 92.8 percent of the blacks were employed in blue-collar and service jobs; in 1969, 92.4 percent. The number of black women rose from 83 to 196 over the timespan with most of the increase coming in the operative and laborer classifications.

There was only one addition to the list of covered industries in 1969 that was not among the top 10 covered employers in 1966. Replacing the construction industry (which due to reporting quirks is inadequately surveyed), the privately operated public utilities (gas, electric, and sanitary services) were the eighth largest covered industry in 1969. Blacks comprised 7.5 percent of the labor force with 81.6 percent of the blacks employed in the blue-collar and service categories (as opposed to 42.4 percent of the Angloes in these categories). Black women numbered a scant 85, which represented only 4.3 percent of total female employment. Moreover, 31.8 percent of the black women were employed as service workers while only 1.3 percent of Anglo women were similarly classified. Blacks held only 2.5 percent of the white-collar jobs.

Thus in summary, the percentage of blacks in the work force in the 10 leading industries in both 1966 and 1969 approximated their share of the population (25 percent) in only two instances: Medical services and food and kindred products. In 1966, the other eight industries ranged from a participation rate of 1.7 percent to 12.7 percent; by 1969, the range of the other eight was from 4.6 percent to 17.3 percent. In only one of the 10 largest industries--petroleum--did black employment decline (both absolutely and relatively) over the 3-year period. The decline occurred despite a substantial growth in industry employment in Houston.

Except for medical services (in which women traditionally dominate), black women found little opportunity to enter these 10 industries in significant numbers. Excluding medical services and construction (which usually hires few women, regardless of race), the remaining eight largest industries in 1966 had a total of only 704 black women among their 110,463 workers (and 490 of these were in the retail sector alone). If the retail industry is also excluded, none of the seven remaining industries (which includes the five biggest employing industries) had even as many as 100 black female employees.

As the data for 1969 show, there has been little change in the job opportunities for black women. Again excluding medical services (but adding the gas, electric, and sanitary services which replaced construction), the remaining nine largest private industries provided jobs for 2,252 black women among their 144,098 employees (or 1.5 percent of total employment). If the retail sector (which alone employed 1,272 black women) is excluded, none of the remaining eight largest employment-generating industries had more than 196 black women on their payrolls. The range for the eight was from 47 to 196, with the median being 115 black female employees.

In neither 1966 nor 1969 can it be said that blacks have been able to indent the white-collar ranks outside of the medical services industry. And in medical services, it is only black women who have found white-collar positions. In 1966, 93 percent of the white-collar jobs held by blacks in medical services were held by black women; in 1969, the figure was 91 percent. Hence, it appears that there are both higher penetration rates and better occupational positioning by blacks in industries that are characteristically high employers of women than there are in industries where men dominate.

The obvious question arises, then, as to which industries covered by EEOC employ blacks? The two largest in 1966 have already been examined: Medical services and food and kindred products. In 1966, they accounted for 18 percent of all black workers in covered employment. Moreover, they employed 73 percent of all black women employed by private firms with over 100 employees in Houston. The next three largest private employers of blacks were in order: Primary metals, water transportation, and non-electrical manufacturing (which has also been discussed earlier). In total, these five industries employed 35 percent of all black workers in covered industries in 1966.

In 1969, the five industries which employed the largest number of blacks were, in order: Medical services, food and kindred products, wholesale trade, primary metals, and retail trade. These five industries employed 36 percent of all black workers in covered enterprises. Again, as in 1966, medical services and food and kindred products together employed 18 percent of the total.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

In the public sector, the Federal Government is a major employer in the Houston SMSA. In the years between 1965 and 1967, the number of Federal employees increased by 2,481 to 15,799. (See table 15.) Of the 1967 total, 3,418 (or 21.6 percent) were black; but 63 percent of the blacks were employed in the Post Office Department. Whatever wage system they worked under, blacks dominated the lowest paying categories. Typically, these occupations are the least skilled and afford the poorest opportunities for advancement. Using the concept of the index of occupational position which was discussed earlier, a forthcoming study will compare the occupational positions of blacks in Federal employment in 41 separate SMSA's.51/ Of these (including all 12 of the SMSA's larger than Houston), the study will show that Houston ranked the lowest (41st) in the degree of black penetration of the better paying jobs.

Aside from direct employment, the Federal Government exercises another significant influence on employment in Houston through its spending policies. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) disclosed that in fiscal year 1968, the Federal Government spent $1.1 billion in Harris County--$728 million of this within the Houston city limits.52/ The figures include money expended for salaries of persons on Federal payrolls, social security benefits, all Federal loan and grant programs, grants for public works projects, and other miscellaneous expenditure categories. The major

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51/ Lynn Rittenoure, "Negro Employment in the Federal Service in the South." This is a Ph.D dissertation being written at the University of Texas at Austin as a part of the Negro Employment in the South project which sponsored the present study. The 41 SMSA's being surveyed are both in and out of the South.

52/ "U.S. Spent $1.1 Billion in Harris During Fiscal '68," The Houston Post, Feb. 9, 1969, p. 5.

TABLE 15. BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1965 AND 1967

Pay category	1965			1967		
	Total employment	Black employment		Total employment	Black employment	
		Number	Percent of total		Number	Percent of total
Total, all pay categories	13,318	2,777	20.9	15,799	3,418	21.6
Total, General Schedule.....	7,478	614	8.2	8,569	753	8.8
GS-1 through 4	1,639	436	26.6	1,726	505	29.3
GS-5 through 8.....	1,565	113	7.2	1,688	124	7.3
GS-9 through 11.....	1,878	57	3.0	2,062	105	5.1
GS-12 through 18	2,396	8	.3	3,093	19	.6
Total, Wage Board.	1,116	466	41.8	1,097	468	42.7
Less than $4,500	305	270	88.5	246	242	98.4
$4,500 to $6,499.....	323	175	54.2	268	172	64.2
$6,500 to $7,999.....	404	21	5.2	398	51	12.8
$8,000 and over.....	84	0	0	185	3	1.6
Total, Postal Field Service	4,513	1,641	36.4	5,985	2,160	36.1
PFS 1 through 4.....	3,802	1,490	39.2	5,033	1,932	38.4
PFS 5 through 8.....	594	150	25.3	793	225	28.4
PFS 9 through 11.....	98	1	1.0	132	3	2.3
PFS 12 through 20.....	19	0	0	27	0	0
Total, other pay plans	211	56	26.5	148	37	25.0
Less than $4,500	137	55	40.1	62	33	53.2
$4,500 to $6,499.....	23	0	0	27	3	11.1
$6,500 to $7,999.....	4	0	0	6	0	0
$8,000 and over.....	47	1	2.1	53	1	1.9

Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission.

agencies involved were: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), $281 million; the Department of Defense, $201 million; and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, $184 million. The multiplier effect of an infusion of this magnitude on the local economy is immense. It is certain that blacks and whites have benefited by enhanced job opportunities, but it is impossible to separate the filter effect by race.

Because of its size, the influence of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center deserves special mention. The center is about equidistant from the cities of Houston and Galveston, located within the Houston SMSA but on the border of the Galveston SMSA. Many employees live in Clear Lake City (within the Houston SMSA), but NASA does draw from both labor markets. It was estimated, however, that in 1966 only about 40 percent of the employees had been hired locally.53/ The hiring differed widely by occupation: almost all of the technical and clerical workers were hired locally, whereas only 10 percent of the scientists, engineers, and administrative personnel were. If allowance is made for employment generated by the presence of the center, it is estimated that between 1960 and 1966 an additional 135,000 jobs were created in the area.

The racial employment patterns for NASA in Texas (which in this instance are virtually synonymous for the Houston complex) in 1967 are presented in table 16. With almost 52 percent of the general schedule jobs in the GS-12 through GS-18 classifications, it is apparent that most of the jobs require training and experience beyond college. Blacks held only 0.6 percent of these top jobs. In total, the 114 black employees represented a mere 2.6 percent of the Government workers at the center. The occupational structure, with its emphasis on white-collar jobs with high levels of educational attainment, combined with the far distance of the center from the black population clusters, led a group of black school officials and counselors to conclude in 1968 that:

> All agree that the answer to the woes of the disadvantaged youth is not to be found at NASA/MSC at this time.54/

MUNICIPAL, COUNTY, AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

With public employment expanding both quantitatively and qualitatively, the participation of minority groups in a growth industry is important to a study of racial employment patterns. For the year 1967, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted a study of racial employment in local government in Houston.55/ The findings, which included 99.3 percent of

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53/ Mary A. Holman and Ronald M. Konkel, "Manned Space Flight and Employment," Monthly Labor Review, March 1968, p. 32.

54/ Vocational Guidance Institute, Report of the 1968 Session, held at Texas Southern University (1968), p. 87.

55/ For All the People...By All the People: A Report on Equal Opportunity in State and Local Government Employment, A Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969).

TABLE 16. BLACK EMPLOYMENT BY THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION IN TEXAS, 1967

Pay plan	Total	White	Black	Percent Black
Total, all pay plans	4,339	4,225	114	2.6
Total, General Schedule	4,143	4,055	88	2.1
GS-1 through 4	430	403	27	6.3
GS-5 through 8	626	608	18	2.9
GS-9 through 11	953	922	31	3.3
GS-12 through 18	2,134	2,122	12	.6
Total, Wage Board	196	170	26	13.3
Less than $4,500	0	0	0	0
$4,500 through $6,499	42	22	20	47.6
$6,500 through $7,999	44	38	6	13.6
$8,000 and over	110	110	0	0

Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission.

the full-time, non-Federal government employees in the Houston SMSA, are presented in table 17. Although the occupational penetration rate for blacks (who held 19 percent of the jobs) is higher than that found in most of the previously discussed private industries, the occupational position of the black employees reinforces the general Houston employment patterns. Minority groups are sparsely represented in the white-collar positions which provide the greatest opportunities for advancement and high incomes.

As is apparent in table 17, the City of Houston is the largest employer of blacks of the local government bodies in the SMSA. But, as shown in table 18, two-thirds of the blacks employed by the city (excluding those in public safety) are employed in the laborer classification--a job classification that is excluded from civil service coverage and the job security it affords. In total, 1,388 (or 93 percent) of the blacks were employed in blue-collar jobs as operatives, craftsmen, laborers, or service workers. Table 19 presents the occupational distribution by race of city employees involved in public safety. For the year 1967, there were a scant 48 blacks on the police force (none in an administrative capacity), 48 in the fire department (none in administrative positions), and none employed in city correctional work. By 1968, three additional black patrolmen and five additional black firemen were hired. As in most urban centers, the racial composition of the police force has been a highly controversial topic. Blacks comprise only about 3 percent of the force, although they number almost 25 percent of the city's population. This issue was discussed in detail at a 1968 session of the Vocational Guidance Institute. The conclusion reached by these predominantly black school officials was:

> The Police Department currently seems to be limited in terms of promotion for minority groups. It was implied that the difficulty minority persons have in passing tests is responsible for the limits on advancement in the Police Department. It is our general opinion that little effort is being made to recruit and employ minority youth.56/

Since 1967, the mayor has prepared a report on minority employment in city government as part of an annual commentary on minority problems in general. The report is disseminated to the black community to demonstrate that the city is "one that has a mission toward its minority groups."57/ It is apparent from this review of the racial employment patterns that the "mission" is far from being completed.

56/ Vocational Guidance Institute, op. cit., p. 72.

57/ Dear Citizen...Report 2 on Minority Group Problems and Progress, (Houston: Office of the Mayor, Aug. 31, 1968), p. 12.

TABLE 17. ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF FULL-TIME (NON-FEDERAL) EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSTON SMSA, 1967

Governmental body	Total	Anglo	Black	Mexican American
State	2,834	2,498	159	177
City of Houston	8,417	6,074	1,608	735
Counties	3,047	2,738	238	71
Large municipalities	894	626	130	138
Small municipalities	857	611	152	94
Special districts	3,029	1,498	1,273	258
Total employees	19,078	14,045	3,560	1,473

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

TABLE 18. BLACK EMPLOYMENT BY FUNCTION[1] FOR THE CITY OF HOUSTON, 1967

Occupational group	Total employees	Total Blacks	Percent Blacks	Financial administration and general control	Community development	Health and hospitals	Public utilities	All others
Total employees	5,077	1,479	29.1	661	2,833	428	762	393
Total Black	--	--	--	13	717	68	609	72
Officials and managers	313	19	6.0	0	19	0	0	0
Professional and technical	751	30	3.9	3	1	25	0	1
Office and clerical	996	42	4.2	5	23	5	0	9
Craftsmen and operatives	1,295	307	23.7	1	146	5	154	1
Laborers	1,388	978	7.1	3	502	3	429	41
Service workers	334	103	30.8	1	26	30	26	20

[1] Excluding public safety (see table 19).

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

TABLE 19. BLACK EMPLOYEES IN PUBLIC SAFETY OCCUPATIONS IN THE CITY OF HOUSTON, 1967

Agency and type of occupation	All employees	Black employees
City Police Department		
Total employees	1,927	81
Civilian employees	552	33
Officials, managers, professional, and technical	46	0
Office, clerical, and others	506	33
Ranked personnel	1,375	48
Administrative	17	0
Supervisory	138	0
Investigative	339	13
Uniformed patrolmen	856	35
Clerical, technical, and others	25	0
City Fire Department		
Total employees	1,397	48
Civilian employees	71	2
Officials, managers, professional, and technical	3	0
Office, clerical, and others	68	2
Uniformed force	1,326	46
Administrative	63	0
Supervisory	325	4
Operational	938	42
City Correctional Institutions		
Total employees	16	0
Regular personnel	1	0
Officials, managers, professional, and technical	1	0
Office, clerical, and others	0	0
Ranked personnel	15	0
Administrative	0	0
Supervisory	1	0
Operational	14	0

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

Second to the City of Houston, table 17 shows that an amorphous category known as "special districts" was the largest public employer of blacks in the Houston SMSA. Two of these public districts--the Harris County Hospital District (with 889 black employees) and the Harris County Navigation District(with 292 black employees)--accounted for 94 percent of the blacks in the category. There is no occupational breakdown available for this category. The independent school districts were excluded from the survey by the Commission.

Employment of blacks by the State of Texas, in county government, and in other municipalities is minimal. The occupational pattern of these blacks resembles the pattern of the aforementioned local governmental bodies: blacks are clustered in the blue-collar jobs in the service, operative, and laborer occupations.

OTHER AREAS

When the number of blacks accounted for by the EEOC survey of all private employers of over 100 employees is combined with the figures for government, the fact remains that about two-thirds of the blacks in the Houston labor market remained unaccounted for. The explanation rests with the conclusion drawn by the Research Department of the Concentrated Employment Program:

> In Houston, Negroes are overwhelmingly concentrated in personal service occupations such as maids, cooks, dishwashers, and yard men. Despite the fact that there had been some upgrading, the mass of Negroes have been untouched.58/

Support for the conclusion is given by a review of the occupations of the black populations in the "original CEP area" for the period July 1968-June 1969 (see table 20). Of the 14,000 black women, an inordinately high number are employed as domestics in private households, as waitresses, and in the laundry and drycleaning sector. In total, these three groupings accounted for 51.1 percent of the total number of employed black women. Black men were overwhelmingly concentrated in blue-collar jobs--especially as operatives and as nonfarm laborers. The janitor category also contained an inordinately high number of black men.

SUMMARY

Reviewing the prevailing employment patterns for blacks in the Houston labor market, several conclusions can be drawn. In the largest employment sectors, the penetration rate for black men has been slight and for black women almost nonexistent. In those growth industries which blacks have entered in significant numbers, they remain clustered in blue-collar jobs. White-collar jobs for blacks are rare. Numerically, the vast preponderance of blacks are working in declining occupational sectors, in small businesses, or as domestics in private homes.

58/ From personal interview with members of the Research Department, Concentrated Employment Program, Houston, Tex. (June 27, 1968).

TABLE 20. EMPLOYED PERSONS BY OCCUPATION, ETHNIC GROUP, AND SEX IN THE ORIGINAL CEP AREA OF THE HOUSTON SMSA, JULY 1968-JUNE 1969
[Percent distribution]

Occupation	Men				Women			
	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo	Total	Black	Mexican American	Anglo
Total: Number	27,400	16,400	6,400	4,600	18,900	14,000	2,500	2,400
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
White-collar workers	15.0	13.8	8.9	27.3	25.9	19.0	35.3	56.1
Professional and technical	3.5	2.8	2.4	7.7	5.9	5.6	3.8	9.7
Managers	4.3	4.1	1.3	8.9	3.0	2.0	5.4	6.6
Clerical workers	5.9	5.8	4.1	9.1	14.2	9.4	23.2	33.1
Sales workers	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.6	2.8	2.1	2.9	6.6
Blue-collar workers	72.1	71.4	81.1	62.2	15.3	12.9	30.2	13.9
Craftsmen and foremen	18.8	12.9	25.8	30.1	1.0	.8	1.4	1.5
Carpenters and construction	7.0	5.3	9.4	10.0	.1	.1	0	0
Mechanics and repairmen	5.0	3.9	6.3	7.5	.2	.2	0	.5
All other	6.7	3.8	10.2	12.7	.7	.5	1.4	1.0
Operatives	32.4	34.0	34.3	24.3	13.7	11.4	28.3	11.9
Drivers and deliverymen	10.9	13.5	6.1	8.2	.5	.6	.5	0
Laundry and dry cleaning	.9	1.2	.8	0	5.1	6.3	1.9	1.5
All other	20.6	19.2	27.5	16.1	8.0	4.5	25.9	10.4
Nonfarm laborers	20.9	24.5	20.9	7.8	.7	.8	.5	.5
Service workers	12.3	13.9	9.8	10.2	58.8	68.0	34.4	30.1
Private household	0	.1	0	0	27.4	35.0	6.4	5.2
Other service workers	12.3	13.8	9.8	10.2	31.3	33.0	28.0	24.9
Charwomen, janitors, and porters	5.5	7.9	3.1	.4	1.6	.5	6.3	3.1
Waiters, cooks, and bartenders	2.7	3.0	2.9	1.4	9.3	9.8	6.7	8.9
Kitchen helpers	.8	.7	1.1	.9	2.3	2.8	1.4	.5
Protective	1.2	.3	1.1	4.3	0	0	0	0
All other	2.2	2.0	1.7	3.3	18.1	19.9	13.6	12.4
Farmworkers	.6	.9	.2	.3	0	0	0	0

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: Urban Employment Survey, U.S. Department of Labor.

Hence, if public policy seeks to alter these patterns, it must concern itself with upgrading the skills of those black men employed in growth industries and opening the doors of these industries to black women by challenging the obvious patterns of discrimination. With most blacks currently employed in smaller enterprises, public attention should be given to providing opportunities for upgrading or exit from this sector. The degree to which current policy and programs are responding to these needs is the subject of the next chapter.

IV. EFFORTS TO ALTER THE PREVAILING BLACK EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

During the 1960's, a new public policy era was embarked upon. Known as an active manpower policy, it consists of the conscientious effort of Government to develop the employment potential of the Nation's human resources. Initially, manpower programs were developed in response to fears of massive occupational obsolescence of semiskilled workers in an increasingly technological society. By the mid-sixties, the target group had changed. Declining aggregate unemployment rates and rising public concern for the poverty stricken refocused manpower policy toward the needs of the economically disadvantaged. As blacks represent a disproportionately high number of this group, they have been a focal point of these undertakings throughout the Nation. In Houston, manpower programs represent the only significant effort to alter prevailing racial employment patterns. As such, the individual endeavors deserve brief commentary.

THE CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

Launched in Houston in September 1967, the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) is a coordinating mechanism for the training programs of the U.S. Department of Labor. Under this arrangement, many diverse manpower programs are packaged into a single contract which offers a wide array of services. The chief advantage of CEP is that it allows these separate undertakings--which were designed to meet specific categories of need--to be marshaled and directed upon target populations within a city. CEP seeks to provide coordination of program effort. Originally, the local Community Action Agency of the antipoverty program in Houston, the privately incorporated Harris County Community Action Agency (HCCAA), was the CEP sponsor. But after 2-1/2 years of internal bickering (between CEP and HCCAA officials) and community criticism of HCCAA, the CEP contract was transferred on February 7, 1970, by the Department of Labor to the sponsorship of the Harris County Commissioners Court. 59/

During its first year, the CEP's operations were confined to 22 census tracts in the central core of the city:

> Generally speaking, the area is densely populated with numerous renter-occupied and multiple-family dwellings of which 35 percent to 50 percent are in disrepair. The area is further

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59/ For a discussion of some of the difficulties between various factions in the city over the operation of HCCAA and CEP, see Steven Markowitz, "Training and Job Creation: A Case Study," Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Spring 1968, pp. 488-496. (The case study was of the Houston CEP.) Subsequent interviews conducted during the present study confirm the original findings of Mr. Markowitz.

> characterized by a high percentage of female-headed households; a low median level of educational attainment; a high concentration of persons in low-wage scale occupations; and a high rate of unemployment and/or underemployment. 60/

In late 1968, seven additional tracts in the Sunnyside area were added to the original CEP jurisdiction.

The CEP headquarters is centrally located within the target area in a renovated building closely resembling those of the deteriorative neighborhood that surrounds it. Its staff (as of mid-1968) was 53.4-percent black, 19.4-percent Mexican-American, and 27.2-percent Anglo.

The CEP has centered primarily on the needs of impoverished blacks. As various components of the program are constantly being recycled, it is difficult to cite percise statistics on the degree of black participation. Staff observations and available data suggest that blacks constitute about 82 percent of all participants. 61/

A breakdown of the various programs included within the CEP umbrella is presented in table 21 along with the cumulative levels of participation. CEP officials report that about 22 percent of the male participants dropped out before completion of the classes they were enrolled in; for females, the dropout rate was about 11 percent. Thus, the dropout rate for men was twice that for women.

The most striking characteristic of the enrollees in the program is the disproportionate number of female participants. Although there is a problem of possible double counting, CEP reported that about 80 percent of its participants in its first 16 months were women. CEP officials readily admit that male participants "have been comparatively rare in the CEP since 1967." 62/ There are a number of reasons for this imbalance. First, of course, the overall labor market has been very tight, and the thrust of the job-training programs has been toward entry-level jobs which pay about the Federal minimum wage. Such opportunities are scarce for women. One Texas Employment Commission official synthesized the situation as follows:

> For men, we (i.e., TEC) can always place them in a job paying $1.60 an hour. We have a standing backlog of job orders for any man who walks in here looking for a job. For women, however, they'd be tickled to death to find a $1.60 per hour job. They are trying to escape the $36 a week job that requires 48 hours of work as a bus girl or maid that are usually the only jobs available to them.

60/ Houston Concentrated Employment Program, "The Target Area."

61/ Data provided through personal interviews with staff members of the Houston Concentrated Employment Program.

62/ CEP Staff Reporter, Jan. 23, 1969, p. 1.

TABLE 21. PROGRAMS AND CUMULATIVE PARTICIPATION LEVELS BY SEX IN THE OFFERING OF THE HOUSTON CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, SEPTEMBER 5, 1967-DECEMBER 19, 1968

Program	Men	Women
Adult Basic Education (full-time)	76	485
Adult Basic Education (part-time)	52	363
MDTA—institutional	122	845
MDTA—on-the-job	77	128
Neighborhood Youth Corps	133	436
New Careers	23	209
Special Impact	178	586
Direct job placement[1]	526	527
Orientation[2]	96	1,456

[1] Means that no training was provided by CEP; these people were placed directly into jobs through the auspices of CEP and the TEC.

[2] A category that served as an introduction to some people who were not immediately assigned to other programs. It represents a form of double counting in that eventually these individuals were assigned to one of the other categories for placement or training. For this reason, it is not possible to sum these columns.

Source: Houston Concentrated Employment Program.

> Women's occupations tend to cluster at skill poles--either at highly skilled (as stenographers or secretaries or nurses) or low skilled (bus girl, bar girl, domestic, or other personal service). We have a saying around the office here that when a girl comes in looking for a job, we say "what'll it be, baby, steno or bar girl?" 63/

The deputy director of the CEP concurred with this general appraisal:

> Females want to be productive workers, but we have trouble placing them. We can place all the males even without training if we want, given the tight labor market. There is a need to take a close look at the male jobs--many could be done by the females. 64/

Accordingly, it is no surprise that women enroll in the training programs where they receive a training allowance that approximates or exceeds what they can receive in the open market. For men, the training allowances are not an attractive alternative.

A second factor that restricts the participation rate of men is the restrictive nature of the federally determined guidelines for eligibility. As indicated above, most black men can find jobs that pay $1.60 to $1.80 an hour. Such wage rates provide an income level in the range of $3,200 to $3,600 per year. Although this income level is acknowledged to be inadequate to support a family, it can serve to make one ineligible for participation in local manpower endeavors. Most programs require that the participant be "economically disadvantaged" as defined by nationally set income criteria. In the case of Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) programs, 80 percent of all participants must be "disadvantaged." The net effect is that opportunities for men to be upgraded are unavailable. Since most men can obtain entry-level jobs without training, there is no need to spin wheels in a training class. The 1970 report of the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) for Houston pinpointed the problem:

> The existing poverty "income criteria" are unrealistic and result in precluding large numbers of the disadvantaged from upgrading their status. Working only part time, most males can achieve the required income level defined as the "poverty line." As a result, however, these same individuals do not rise above the unskilled or semiskilled status because they cannot participate in vocational training which insists on training only those individuals who fall below this arbitrary poverty level which has not kept pace with our highly inflationary economy. 65/

63/ From personal interview with an official of the Texas Employment Commission's Houston Opportunity Center (June 19, 1968).

64/ From personal interview with an official of Houston's Concentrated Employment Program (June 21, 1968).

65/ "Gulf Coast Comprehensive Manpower Plan," p. 12.

The Houston CAMPS report recommended that the poverty standard be raised and that poverty restriction be removed as an eligibility criterion for the training of underemployed people. 66/ The need to implement these changes was reinforced by testimony in June 1970, before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Houston. A number of witnesses bitterly assailed the operation of the manpower programs in Houston for not meeting the needs of minority group men. The regional director of the Texas Employment Commission, Homer Jackson, replied to these charges that his hands were tied--the fault, he charged, was the federally imposed guidelines. He testified:

> We find a number of males, heads of households, minority group members who are living below an acceptable standard, yet are not provided the benefits of the many Federal programs due to an arbitrary base line called the "poverty-income criterion." In other words, a family consisting of man, wife, and two children must not make above $3,600 per year to qualify for Federal program application. In fact, members of families, young people 18 and 19 years old, are included; if they are unemployed, we cannot give them training if their family income is above this average, and that is something that I am diametrically opposed to. This, in effect, ties our hands in the matter of to what degree we provide treatment to the ills of the disadvantaged. 67/

A third explanation for the low male participation in the program is the format of the training itself. The classes are taught during the day, so many men would have to forego opportunities for employment to take training. Again, a CEP official indicated the nature of the predicament with these words:

> Negro men are more underemployed than they are unemployed. Besides, these men know these training programs have been a failure, so they are reluctant to come to our programs. As things now stand, all of our classes are taught during the day so males are reluctant to give up the jobs they have to come to our classes. We are proposing that the classes be taught at night so that these males can keep their jobs during the day and then come here at night to be trained for a better job and also receive a training allowance.
>
> Also, males are fearful about quitting jobs and coming back to school, which is what the training really is. They are nervous about it since they have had bad memories of school. 68/

66/ Ibid.

67/ U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, They Have the Power --We Have the People: The Status of Equal Employment Opportunity in Houston, Texas, 1970 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 56.

68/ From personal interview with an official of Houston's Concentrated Employment Program (June 21, 1968).

As of mid-1969, only one night class had been introduced--in adult basic education.

A fourth deterrent to male participation is the type of jobs for which training is provided. Most of the training is for entry-level jobs for which the pay will be little different from that earned by an untrained man. The local representative of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) summed up the situation with this observation:

> Many of the Federal training programs are not training people for the occupations that really need skill training. In too many instances, they are providing training for jobs that any youngster with any initiative can pick up 69/

Specifically, the spokesman mentioned training to become guards, groundskeepers, and custodians.

It is not possible for a review such as this to evaluate the total performance of the CEP undertaking in Houston. Its dependence upon the Houston Independent School District to teach its vocational classes; the Texas Employment Commission to do its recruitment, counseling, testing, and job placement; the Vocational Guidance Service to administer the New Careers program; and the Cresant Foundation to run the MDTA on-the-job training component and the Neighborhood Youth Corps (in-school) program makes it difficult to generalize about either its failures or its successes. Despite its vulnerability to criticism, it represents the main flank of the effort in Houston to reach a quantitatively significant number of disadvantaged blacks. How well in a qualitative sense these individuals are being served remains an open question for a long-term study.

The CEP experience with the placemnt of its participants, however, is particularly revealing. Job development with private industry has been very difficult. The frustrations of the program effort are reflected in these comments by a CEP official:

> In this city there is a real need for a community relations program for industry--not just for the police. Businessmen just don't know how to deal with minority people. Industry is still asking for the "super Negro." There is no thrust for meeting the hiring needs of the disadvantaged. There is no problem in this city in hiring the Negro college graduate.
>
> This time of year we get all kinds of requests from businesses since compliance reviews are in process. The witch hunt is on! So we (CEP officials) get invitations from businessmen to come to lunch, and we get letters on

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69/ From personal interview with a local official of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Houston, Texas (June 24, 1968).

> official stationery--which later can be shown to the compliance people as evidence of intent--but once this period has passed, we contact them, and they deny they ever heard of us.
>
> We are not begging private industry to take guys who are no good. We have given them some training--all private business has to do is put some polish on the apple. Most of the businessmen approach us with the pseudo-Christian attitude that they are doing us a favor. 70/

The placement problems are no doubt compounded by the dominance of female enrollees and the related problem of finding jobs that will pay at least as much as they earn while in training. The burden upon CEP of accommodating disadvantaged women has been exacerbated by the placement preferences of the Job Opportunities in the Business Sectors (JOBS) Program. As will be discussed later, 74 percent of the participants in the JOBS Program in Houston in its first year were men. Hence, CEP has been left with the far more difficult task. As an experienced CEP spokesman said of the JOBS effort, "Anyone can place males in entry jobs in Houston."

CEP officials feel that one of the key attributes of the program is that the CEP operations can more easily relate to the needs of the mass number of blacks for whom job training and placement are desirable. Such is the case because of its proximity to the black population concentrations and its predominantly minority group staff. Moreover, realizing the usual fears and suspicions frequently held by poor people concerning Government ventures, the CEP officials claim that they make a special effort to accommodate and to assist the people that seek their services. Emphasis is placed on the individual and his personal needs. In the words of one staff member:

> We give immediate attention to our clients here. It's not like at TEC where they are treated in a "factory system" fashion. Down there they often have to sit around and wait for hours, and they are only known by their DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles) number instead of their name. 71/

The long-term significance of the CEP undertaking--as well as all other public and private training ventures--rests not merely with placing people in jobs but with keeping them on the job. With special reference to men, CEP officials report that retention difficulties do not rest so much with training preparation as with the working environment in large corporate enterprises. Specifically, they report:

> The really critical thing is not so much getting these men jobs as it is keeping them employed. Most of the guys from the ghettos that we meet have only worked for small

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70/ From personal interview with an official of Houston's Concentrated Employment Program (June 21, 1968).

71/ Ibid.

> enterprises--typically where one guy runs the whole show. The ghetto guy has no experience working with the large impersonal corporation and there is no real way that we can prepare him for this. 72/

Although it is hard to assess its significance, this consideration suggests that there may be another function that the National Alliance of Businessmen could perform. Namely, it could offer technical advice and periodic classes to explain exactly "how it is" to work for a large enterprise. Such a program of work knowledge could serve as a useful adjunct to the present NAB concentration upon work habits and skill attainment.

THE HOUSTON OPPORTUNITY CENTER

The Houston Opportunity Center (HOC), operated by the Texas Employment Commission, is designed to provide job assistance to people who do not live in the CEP areas or those living in CEP areas who do not qualify as being "disadvantaged." The visual contrasts between HOC and CEP are glaring. HOC is located in a renovated building, as is the CEP center, but in physical features there is no comparison. HOC is brightly painted, well-lighted, and well-appointed in its office facilities. HOC, although centrally located, is not in a poverty neighborhood. The most striking contrast is the notable fewness of black staff members; HOC had only one black staff member in June 1968 among its approximately 75 employees. He was assistant director of the Apprenticeship Information Center.

Through its auspices, HOC refers individuals to the total array of Federal manpower training programs available in the city. Unlike the CEP, however, HOC does not itself offer training courses. Rather, it provides recruiting, counseling, testing, job development, and referral services and maintains certain special functions not available elsewhere in the city--as with regard to Job Corps referrals and apprenticeship information. As HOC merely refers applicants to training, it does not have statistics on the racial composition of persons actually enrolled in MDTA classes outside the CEP area. From a random sample of individual MDTA projects, it appears that blacks were well-represented in the individual classes. 73/

One of the major citywide functions performed by HOC has been the assistance given to an annual Job Fair. HOC--as part of TEC's Summer Placement Program--has recruited disadvantaged youngsters for jobs developed by the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Houston Chamber of Commerce. In 1968, the Job Fair drew about 8,000 disadvantaged individuals, of whom 75 percent were black. At least 739 of those attending were verified as having been placed in summer jobs by June 1968, which undoubtedly understates the number actually placed. One TEC official commented that: "A lot of the jobs that the companies provided to disadvantaged kids this summer

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72/ Ibid.

73/ For example, in one class for TV repairmen, there were 24 graduates of whom nine were black; in an auto mechanics class of 20, there were 13 black graduates; all 17 in a class of health aides were black; and in a welding class of 20, eight were black.

would have normally gone to middle class kids so that in a real sense, they did not create 'new' jobs just for them." In total, the Job Fair and the Summer Placement Program (as of mid-June 1968) had contact with 11,517 people, 4,019 of whom were black women and 1,717 of whom were black men. Although precise placement figures are unavailable, interviews with TEC spokesmen unanimously agreed that it was far easier to place men than women.

THE NSC TRAINING CENTER

Opening its training center in 1967, the Northern Systems Company (NSC) inaugurated the initial experiment in Houston whereby private industry assumed responsibility for training the hard-core disadvantaged. The program was called Action in Development of Employment Skills (ADES). NSC is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Northern Natural Gas Company of Omaha, Nebraska, established to conduct training activities under Federal grants. According to a staff official, "NSC is trying to prove that such undertakings can be financially profitable as well as socially beneficial." 74/

The company has similar undertakings in Los Angeles and Detroit. NSC was awarded the contract to provide such training in Houston by the U.S. Department of Labor under the terms of the Ten Cities Experimental Program (also known as the MA-1 program).

The enrollees were advanced through a series of stages of prevocational instruction. The center, located in the heart of the central ghetto area, was purposely designed to resemble a job setting as opposed to a school environment. The enrollee was continually reminded that he was "going to work" when he came to the center. The program emphasized teaching the enrollees how to learn. Hence, stress was placed on (1) social skills on the job and (2) an introduction to the world of work itself. The former concerned getting along with fellow workers; understanding job discipline; advising on such matters as calling in if you were going to be absent; and the importance of being punctual. As one official observed, "Frequently these people are not even aware that they are breaking an accepted norm; it is not that they are willingly going against society but rather that they do not know what society expects from them." 75/ Following completion of training at the center, the enrollees were placed in either jobs or regular on-the-job training (OJT) positions in private industry. The jobs were all to pay at least $1.60 per hour. The other companies became OJT subcontractors to NSC and were reimbursed at the rate of $25 per trainee per week for up to 16 weeks to cover their extra training expenses. Afterward, the subcontractors were expected to retain the individuals as permanent employees. If OJT was not needed, the individual was placed directly in a job.

During the 16 months of operation, the NSC enrolled 579 people--434 of whom were blacks. All but 44 completed the 8-week course of study. The

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74/ From personal interview with personnel official of the Northern Systems Company, Houston, Tex. (June 26, 1968).

75/ Ibid.

age range was from 16 to 62 with a concentration between 22 and 34 and a median age of 30. Reports prepared by NSC staff disclosed that the wage levels of the participants were raised on the average by 50 percent (from $1.19 to $1.79 per hour) as a result of being able to qualify for better jobs. 76/

Some of the experiences of the NSC training programs are useful as an indication of the dimensions of the effort to assist disadvantaged Houstonians through such undertakings. It was necessary to introduce a course in driver education once it was realized that many trainees lacked driver's licenses to qualify for some jobs and because "many of the jobs available in the Houston area were outside the city bus zones." 77/ Hence, the recurrent problem of inadequate public transportation again appears as a barrier to employability. Another problem for NSC resulted from the sex composition of the training groups. Although NSC had expected a larger proportion of men and had planned its training program accordingly, 60 percent of the enrollees were women selected by TEC after being certified as hard-core unemployed. Because of the company's obligation to place people in jobs that would pay at least the equivalent of the Federal minimum wage, training for jobs in hospitals, restaurants, and motels was precluded. 78/ Thus, the company concluded:

> It was found that the wage structure for women was consistently lower than equivalent structures for men. This drastically narrowed the employment opportunities for female placements at an hourly wage minimum of $1.60. 79/

As a result, NSC sought to persuade employers to alter some of their sex requirements for certain jobs in order to open new employment areas for women. The response was mixed. The company was able to place women in some traditionally "men's jobs"--such as parking lot attendants and meter readers for the light and power company. The placement of men, on the other hand, was by no means as complex.

NSC reported difficulties in securing OJT positions with numerous employers who objected to contracting with the Federal Government. Some employers refused to participate because it was understood that the trainees were likely to be blacks.

Its initial contract expired on December 27, 1968. NSC applied for a second contract (under the MA-4 program), but its application was denied in early 1969. Subsequently, the company closed its Houston operations, and its teaching materials were requisitioned by the CEP center.

76/ Final Report MA-1 Contract, NSC Training Center, Houston, Texas, p. 24.

77/ Ibid., p. 7.

78/ Ibid., p. 15.

79/ Ibid., p. 21.

HOPE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

The primary self-help program in Houston is the Human-Organizational-Political and Economic (HOPE) Development Association directed by the Reverend Earl Allen. HOPE's basic mission is "to bring an end to poverty, injustice, and powerlessness in the black community." 80/ Founded in August 1967, it subsists on private contributions by local citizens and by grants from the Inter-Religious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO) of New York City. Reverend Allen is first vice president of IFCO. HOPE receives no Federal funds. As of April 1969, it had a staff of 14 full-time employees and was operating on a budget of about $8,000 a month.

HOPE was established "because existing institutions, programs, and projects have been ineffective in their efforts to do away with conditions of poverty and racial injustice." 81/ Although its leaders disclaim violence as a tactic, they do "advocate militancy" in their quest for changes. HOPE espouses adherence to a goal of black power, which it defines to mean that "black Americans must have political, economic, and educational power to control their own communities in order to meaningfully influence those decisions affecting their lives." 82/

HOPE had a membership of approximately 1,500 people in 1968. In most instances, the staff provides personal assistance to individuals seeking information about welfare benefits, legal services, housing conditions, and job placement. HOPE does little in the way of training itself (although it has conducted at least one class in computer programing and keypunch operations). It has, however, on occasions served an outreach function for recruiting and referring prospective male trainees to the CEP program. But for the most part, HOPE seeks direct placement on jobs for the people who come to it for assistance. It claims to have placed over 500 people in employment in its first year of existence.

The Reverend Allen's involvement in community affairs in Houston began when he became director of community development for the Harris County Community Action Agency. After 8 months he resigned following a bitter internal fight within the organization which culminated in the physical seizure of the HCCAA headquarters by a group of dissidents of which he was one. Speaking of his disappointment with the HCCAA, he is quoted as saying:

> I felt that the job did not afford me the opportunity to do the kind of thing I was interested in doing--mainly, making some sort of a contribution to eliminating the

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80/ HOPE Development, Inc., Facts About HOPE, p.1.
81/ Ibid., p. 2.
82/ Ibid., p. 3.

problems. I did not feel that the structure of the poverty program--because of all the political infighting, the bureaucracy, the lack of certainty--could succeed. I just felt it was a hopeless situation. 83/

His basic criticism of the local community action program in particular and of the entire poverty program in general is that:

> The establishment isn't going to let that happen (let pressure be exerted), and certainly they are not going to tolerate it if it's financed by the Federal Government. Keep the lid on--that's the name of the game. 84/

In addition, Reverend Allen has been a strong critic of the CEP training programs in Houston. He asserts that:

> CEP refuses to use proven methods--as those of the Muslims. To rehabilitate people, it is necessary to provide pride to the individual. CEP doesn't have the expertise to do this. They don't teach self-sufficiency; they only teach job skills. It is necessary for success that the individual see himself as being worth something.
>
> The CEP principle is good, but still the programs are uncoordinated. You still have the same number of hands trying to stir the pot as you had before CEP. You still have all the red tape.
>
> CEP was not set up to handle all the people who need its services, but it didn't tell the people that. If you can't help them, you can't help them, so tell them that. The people understand this--they may not like it, but they understand it. Federal programs believe that they can lie to people, but they can't for long. It is wrong to prolong the agony of people. 85/

As for the role played by private industry in Houston, Reverend Allen commented:

> We are getting very little help from private business. They fail to recognize reality. Until we get away from the

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83/ "A Post Profile of a Texan: Rev. Earl Allen," The Houston Post, Apr. 20, 1969, sec. 7, p. 1.

84/ Ibid.

85/ From personal interview with the Reverend Earl Allen, director of HOPE Development Association, Houston, Tex. (June 26, 1968).

> philosophy of the white man doing something for the black man, there is not going to be any progress. 86/

With regard to the Texas Employment Commission, he claims that "TEC has a terrible reputation among Negroes--yet all of these Federal programs have to operate through its auspices." 87/

Convinced that community organization is a prerequisite to effective community action, Reverend Allen is optimistic as to the future role of HOPE. Under his leadership, HOPE will continue to needle and prod the training and employment institutions of the city while seeking to unite blacks into a political base that can assure responsiveness to the needs of the poor. It is likely that most of the people with whom HOPE has contact are truly the hard-core unemployed and the most needy. For, as Reverend Allen says, "the people we deal with are not looking for dollars but rather for a reason for living."

THE CRESANT FOUNDATION

In June 1966, the Cresant Foundation, a private nonprofit corporation of black business and professional men, was formed with the sole purpose of qualifying as a sponsoring agent for Federal manpower and poverty projects. It operates three ongoing programs. One of these is CEP's Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) in-school project, designed to encourage youngsters to stay in school by providing part-time jobs after school and during the summer. For the 1969 fiscal year, the NYC project had 170 slots for the school year and 432 summer positions.

The Cresant Foundation also has a contract to provide on-the-job training (OJT) in local business establishments. The companies are reimbursed at the standard rate of $25 per week for 36 weeks to cover the extra training expenses. The trainees are recruited from the CEP poverty tracts, but job placements may be anywhere in the city. A total of 250 OJT slots were involved for the fiscal year 1969. The project director summarized his experiences with the OJT program as follows:

> We have had a good reception from small businessmen who need our financial assistance for training employees; but as for the larger ones, we haven't been able to dent them. They don't want our dollars, and especially they don't want to be bothered with the Federal Government. 88/

The third sponsored project, known by the acronym HAPPY (Houston-Austin Planned Program for Youth), is an outgrowth of an MDTA experimental and demonstration project and has been continued as a regular MDTA program.

86/ Ibid.
87/ Ibid.
88/ From personal interview with an official with Project HAPPY, Houston, Tex. (June 27, 1968).

Actually, it has little directly to do with Houston. It is an effort to develop OJT programs for disadvantaged young people from rural areas who live along the 170-mile route between the cities of Austin and Houston. HAPPY seeks to provide opportunities for these individuals in their own small towns. Its goal is to try to stem the hitherto unimpeded flow of such individuals into the Houston labor market. About 75 percent of the 350 participants have been blacks; 20 percent are Mexican Americans; 5 percent are Angloes.

THE CHRISTIAN RESCUE MISSION

In early 1961, the Reverend L.J. Woodward opened the Christian Rescue Mission in the heart of a ghetto district. Although its main function has been to provide food, sleeping facilities, and spiritual messages to the "down and almost out," it also has initiated a job placement program for many of the neediest people in Houston. The mission sponsors a "Free Job" Employment Service. As an indication of its order of magnitude, a report for September 1968 stated that 1,816 telephone calls were received from people seeking jobs. Of this number, 476 were interviewed by its small staff, and 55 people were placed in jobs. An additional 77 people were re-employed by former employers after the intervention of the staff of the mission. 89/ In 1968, the mission reported that it placed a total of 2,000 people. 90/ The mission makes no charge to the employee or the employer for its intermediary services.

In addition to job development and job placement--mostly in casual-type jobs, the mission provides counseling services and a day-care program for working mothers, and it broadcasts regular job information announcements on the predominantly black radio stations of the city. In 1968, it assisted in the creation of a nonprofit corporation known as Better Health and Welfare under the directorship of the Reverend E.G. Fair to assist underprivileged and unfortunate children. The expenses of the program are partially underwritten by funds from the Special Impact Program of the Concentrated Employment Program.

APPRENTICESHIP

A 10-city study of black participation in apprenticeship programs in 1966 found virtually no black apprentices in Houston. The report concluded that "all in all, there is little to be optimistic about concerning the current status and the potential prospects for black participation in apprenticeship programs in Houston." 91/ Although there have been some changes in subsequent years, the topic has remained controversial.

In April 1967, an Apprenticeship Information Center (AIC) was opened in the Houston Opportunity Center and staffed by officials of the Texas

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89/ "Persons Placed on Jobs Through Free Job Employment Service" (Sept. 30, 1968).

90/ From an (Open letter) dated Jan. 8, 1969 from W.L. Woodward to potential contributors.

91/ Marshall and Briggs, op. cit., p. 181.

Employment Commission. The director of the AIC in 1968 was white, and his assistant was black. According to the director, blacks availing themselves of the service of the AIC were approximately 25 percent of all applicants. The AIC officials were instructed to inform the applicants of both the pluses and the minuses of apprenticeship. The regional director of the TEC stated:

> At the AIC, we explain not only the benefits but also the limitations. Moreover, we warn the applicants of the possible futility of seeking such positions, and we try to tell them about other opportunities. 92/

The major function of the AIC was to provide information to young men about opportunities in the apprentice trades and to administer the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) that was used as a preliminary screening device for all applicants. The actual selection for indenture into a program was done by the respective Joint Apprenticeship Committee (JAC) for each craft and not by the AIC.

Traditionally, most apprentice programs in Houston accepted applications throughout the year. As a result, the problem of meeting specific deadlines that exist in most cities has not been an issue. The only exception is the local union of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), but even they take applications for 5 months of a year. The only trade that did not use the AIC for its preliminary testing was the pipefitters' local. It is estimated that there are about 500 new positions a year available in the federally registered apprenticeship programs in Houston. Virtually all of these registered programs are in the building trades (the only exception being some machinist programs). In 1970, there were approximately 2,000 registered apprentices in ongoing programs. All other apprentice programs (primarily in manufacturing, petrochemicals, and service trades) are not registered with the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training of the U.S. Department of Labor (the State of Texas does not approve programs itself as it does not have a State apprenticeship law). In 1970, there were about 1,800 nonregistered apprentices in the city.

The director of the AIC reported that counselors in the predominantly black high schools in Houston do not believe him when he tells them that "times have changed." For those blacks who do apply, the GATB often poses a personal barrier:

> At the AIC, I try to give the applicants some test orientation. I tell them that I won't bite them even though I am a whitey. Most of these Negro youngsters are as nervous about tests as a long-tail cat in a room full of rocking chairs. 93/

92/ From personal interview with regional official of the Texas Employment Commission, Houston, Tex. (June 19, 1968).

93/ From personal interview with an official of the Apprenticeship Information Center, Houston, Tex. (June 27, 1968).

He stated that no effort to advertise the location or the activities of the AIC in either of the black newspapers in Houston (the Houston Informer or Forward Times) was made. An employment service official explained that this is because "TEC is reluctant to advertise any of its programs." The fact that few black youth in Houston have any awareness of apprenticeship was confirmed by a 1968 study of the teenage labor market. The study of mostly 18- to 19-year old youth reported that only 28 percent of the blacks (as opposed to 47 percent of the whites) had any knowledge of the existence of apprenticeship programs. 94/

In mid-1968, the AIC terminated its testing and referral activities. 95/ The entire responsibility for recruitment and placement of minority youth into apprenticeship programs was shifted to the new Apprenticeship Outreach Program (AOP). AOP was inaugurated in May 1968, under a contract with the U.S. Department of Labor and the Houston Building Trades Council. The program is an outgrowth of a February 1968 pledge by the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO to its Miami Convention to initiate its own efforts to increase the flow of minority group members into apprenticeship training. In Houston, the AOP seeks to make direct cont with various black organizations to explain the nature of apprenticeship programs and the opportunities which exist for those who can qualify. Shortly after the endeavor was launched, the district vice president of the Texas AFL-CIO stated: "The Apprenticeship Outreach Program is off to a very good beginning; it is gaining acceptability, and I think it will prove that we (the union movement) can solve this problem ourselves." 96/

The director of AOP is a white member of the carpenters' union, and he is assisted by a black member of the ornamental ironworkers' union. The jurisdiction of the program embraces an immense geographical area of 22 counties. The total indentures for "minority youth" (a term that includes blacks, Mexican-Americans, Orientals, and Indians) recruited during the 20-month period through January 1970 was 90 people. The distribution by trade, of course, is as important as the absolute number of placements. As indicated in table 22, 36 (or 40 percent) of the indentures were in the cement masons which has traditionally been accessible to blacks. The cement masons also had the highest cancellation rate which substantially nullifies its high placemnt figure. In the so-called mechanical trades (i.e., electricians, elevator constructors, ironworkers, operating engineers, pipe trades, and sheetmetal workers), there were 24 placements (or 27 percent of all placements), of which three were later canceled. In total, 38 percent of the 90 original placements have subsequently cancelled. How many of those who remain are black is not reported.

A 1970 evaluation of the operation of the AOP throughout the country reported the Houston program to be one of the least effective. It stated candidly:

94/ Joseph E. Champagne and Robert L. Prater, Teenage Employment: A Study of Low Income Youth in Houston, Texas (Houston: Center for Human Resources, University of Houston, 1969), p. 112.

95/ Letter from the director of the Apprenticeship Information Center, Texas Employment Commission, Houston, Tex. (Mar. 26, 1969).

96/ From personal interview with a regional official of Texas State AFL-CIO, Houston, Tex. (June 27, 1968).

TABLE 22. MINORITY YOUTH PLACEMENTS AND CANCELLATIONS OF THE HOUSTON APPRENTICESHIP OUTREACH PROGRAM, MAY 1968-JANUARY 1970

Trade	Placements	Percent of all placements	Cancellations	Percent of all cancellations
Bricklayers	3	3.3	1	2.9
Carpenters	11	12.2	8	23.5
Cement masons	36	40.0	17	50.0
Electricians	2	2.2	1	2.9
Elevator constructors	2	2.2	0	0
Glaziers	2	2.2	1	2.9
Iron workers	11	12.2	1	2.9
Operating engineers	1	1.1	0	0
Painters	10	11.1	3	8.5
Pipe trades	2	2.2	1	2.9
Plasterers	3	3.3	0	0
Sheetmetal workers	6	6.7	0	0
Floorlayers	1	1.1	1	2.9
All trades	90	100.0	34	100.0

Note: Sums of individual items may not equal totals because of rounding.

Source: "Report of Evaluation of the Apprenticeship Outreach Program," Report to U.S. Department of Labor by the Boise Cascade Center for Community Development (March 1970), p. 70.

> If the goal of the Houston program is taken to be that of having a program to point to which achieves relatively small numbers of placements in trades where placements are easy to achieve and provides a token few blacks for the other unions, then the program has achieved its objectives.
>
> But if the goal is to establish a meaningful foothold for blacks in all unions, the program does not come close to success. And if the goal is to provide a significant number of well paying jobs for blacks in the construction industry, the program is insignificant. 97/

The evaluation report also concluded that "the program operates in an atmosphere of general resistance on the part of most unions (there are exceptions, such as the cement masons) to black entrance into the skilled building trades. 98/

The sponsorship of the Houston AOP by the Houston-Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council should be terminated forthwith. It has failed by every measure to accomplish the objectives set forth by both the U.S. Department of Labor and by the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department. Sponsorship should be shifted to a community group, and immediate investigation by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance should be launched.

Table 23 indicates how few blacks there are in the six mechanical trades. Although the data are for 1967, the AOP figures indicate that only a net addition of 23 "minority youth" has been made to the membership figures of these six crafts through January 1970. Despite the continuing construction boom, it is highly unlikely that blacks comprise as much as one-half of 1 percent of the combined memberships of the six mechanical trades. Virtually all black union members in the construction trades are clustered in the traditionally accessible trades--as laborers and cement masons. Table 23 shows that 82 percent of all black union members were laborers. The need for the AOP to be expanded into recruitment of black journeymen is urgent. It is widely acknowledged that there are many blacks in the nonunion sector as well as union laborers who could be upgraded to positions in the mechanical trades. 99/

Persons interviewed frequently noted that training facilities in Houston were grossly inadequate for the "related instruction" phase of apprenticeship. As a result, the electricians, plumbers, and pipefitters have opened their own training facilities. Most of the other trades rely upon public school facilities. The defeat in the summer of 1968 of a bond issue that would have created a vocationally oriented community college in the city left the need in abeyance.

97/ A Report of an Evaluation of the Apprenticeship Outreach Program, Report to the Manpower Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor by the Boise Cascade Center for Community Development (March 1970), p. 67. (Emphasis is supplied.)

98/ Ibid., p. 71.

99/ They Have the Power, chapter 3.

TABLE 23. TOTAL AND MINORITY MEMBERSHIP IN BUILDING TRADES UNIONS IN THE HOUSTON METROPOLITAN AREA, 1967

Building trade unions	Total membership (number)	Black		Mexican American	
		Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total
Mechanical trades	7,966	6	0.1	162	2.0
Laborers	4,508	3,690	81.9	518	11.5
General construction trades (excluding carpenters)	2,103	277	13.2	149	7.1
Carpenters	7,582	30	.4	286	3.8
Total	22,159	4,003	18.1	1,115	5.0

Source: 1967 Local Union Report EEO-3, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

THE JOBS PROGRAM

In early 1968, it was announced that Houston was to be one of the 50 cities in the original Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) Program. The local committee of the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) set a target quota for fiscal year 1969 of 1,800 jobs for hard-core unemployed adults and, in addition, 4,100 summer jobs for disadvantaged youngsters. All firms with over 100 employees were contacted. Eligible people could be drawn from any sector of the city--regardless of whether or not they lived in the CEP tracts.

As of February 28, 1969, 359 companies hired 4,835 individuals under the NAB contract in Houston, As of that date, however, only 2,665 were actually employed. This is a retention rate of 55 percent. Based upon the characteristics of a 25-percent sample of the participants, it is reported that 5 percent were Anglos, 70 percent were blacks, 14 percent were Mexican Americans, and 11 percent were classified as "other." Men accounted for 74 percent of the participants; women, 26 percent. 100/

The job development potential of the JOBS Program is immense. As one CEP official commented: "The really good thing about the NAB's undertaking is that you have businessmen calling fellow businessmen which is good for placement; these guys know each other well, and it is easier for them to get results." The goal for 1970 has been set for the placement of 3,600 hard-core unemployed.

The trainees in the JOBS Program are recruited by the Texas Employment Commission, the Concentrated Employment Program, and by the companies themselves. Officials of the program, however, report that they are experiencing increasing difficulty in recruiting men who can qualify as being "disadvantaged" under the Federal guidelines. As one NAB official stated it:

> The poverty guidelines in Houston are far too low. A male can easily find work that will price him out of the poverty-income level and therefore disqualify him from participation in our program. The poverty criteria should be raised. 101/

Although data are scarce, the Houston retention rate of only 55 percent is far below the national rate of about 73 percent for the same period. Moreover, the percentage of companies that have signed direct contracts with the Federal Government to defray the extra costs involved in hiring, training, and retaining the participants has hovered around 18 percent in Houston as compared with the national figure of about 33 percent. The larger companies in Houston have generally not asked for Federal reimbursement. Consequently, many of these companies may be less tolerant of poor work habits than they would be if their costs were being covered.

100/ From a letter of Apr. 10, 1969, from Frank C. Caddy, general manager, National Alliance of Businessmen, Houston, Tex.

101/ From personal interview with a NAB official in Houston (Apr. 4, 1969).

This, it would seem, is one explanation for the low retention rate. There also is concern that a disproportionate number of the NAB jobs in Houston (as contrasted with national NAB experience) are of the menial and dead end variety. 102/ If this is so, it would help to explain the high turnover figure. In fairness, however, it should be recalled that the Houston labor market--especially for men--is very tight. Hence, it is likely that the people recruited by the Houston NAB are more truly "hard core" than those in some other cities. It is equally true, however, that many of these workers would have been hired in a tight labor market even without the JOBS Program.

A survey regarding the experience and attitudes of businessmen in general toward teenage (mostly in the 18- and 19-year-old age group) participants in manpower programs was completed in 1969. The survey covered 96 large enterprises (of which 63 were manufacturers) in Houston employing a total of 45,732 employees in plants ranging in size from 130 to 6,000 workers. 103/ Only 17 firms (or 18 percent) reported that they had ever hired teenagers who had been involved in any federally financed training program. These firms were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with these trainees. The ratings were as follows: excellent, 0; good, 7; fair, 9; poor, 0; and one company said that "all categories were applicable." 104/

MODEL CITIES

As indicated in chapter I, Houston has experienced difficulty in qualifying for Federal assistance in almost all areas of housing and urban renewal. Houston is the only one of the Nation's 20 most populous cities without a zoning law. As a result, the few public projects in low-income areas come from local tax revenues. One housing expert quipped in 1969 that "there is a standing joke that Houston money is rebuilding Atlanta." 105/ Atlanta, with a smaller population than Houston, had received over $500 million in urban aid during 1962-1969, while Houston received less than $20 million.

Although the absence of a zoning law and, until December 1969, a housing code has not automatically disqualified Houston from the Model Cities Program, it has severely limited the funds and the number of urban

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102/ See Steven Markowitz, "Business Involvement in the Problems of the Hard Core Unemployed--A Case Study." This case study is of the NAB program in Houston and it represents the author's findings as a part of his MA thesis at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

103/ Champagne and Prater, op. cit., pp. 137-70.

104/ Ibid., p. 166.

105/ "Slum Housing Issue," The Houston Chronicle, Mar. 5, 1969, p. 1 and 14. The comment is attributed to Mr. James King, the director of the New Orleans Model Cities Program.

programs in which the city could participate. 106/ Early in January 1969, Houston received $268,500 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to finance the development of a comprehensive plan for the redevelopment of a downtown slum area (mostly in the original CEP area). An executive of the Humble Oil and Refining Company was "loaned" for 1 year to the city to head the Houston Model City Department. Although he favored the adoption of the housing code, he was less concerned about the need for zoning:

> The way I see the Model Cities Program, if we are trying to be a program of local initiative--then we have to be responsive to the local situation. We have to recognize that Houston is an unzoned city, and it will be an unzoned city for a long, long time--maybe forever. 107/

Thus, to date, the Model Cities Program has had no meaning for Houston's disadvantaged community. The loss is not only to be measured in the absence of better housing, it also represents a forfeiture of high-paying job opportunities for blacks. The program required that the indigenous population be employed in these rebuilding projects. In many cities, this requirement (as well as the entire panoply of other Federal programs) has been used to gain leverage for getting minority youth into apprenticeship programs.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

Not until the late 1960's was there any effort in Houston to provide vocational education for blacks in occupations other than "traditionally Negro" occupations. A 1961 study of the topic by the Southern Regional Council disclosed:

> Discriminatory conditions which materially affect occupational opportunity begin early for Houston Negroes. They are barred from the city's only full-time vocational high school, and vocational courses offered in their own schools are limited to skills which the school system defines as most appropriate for them as adults. 108/

106/ Some of the Federal programs that were precluded by the absence of an enforceable housing code were: (1) Subsidies in which a tenant's rent can be applied toward the purchase of a home; (2) subsidies of interest on loans for low-income individuals to repair or to purchase a home; (3) cash grants of up to $3,000 for home repairs for people judged to be "hardship" cases; (4) concentrated code enforcement whereby the Federal Government will pay two-thirds of the cost of enforcing housing codes and improving streets, sewers, and beautification projects in target neighborhoods; and (5) new public housing which provides units at rents based on the family's income level.

107/ "George McGonigle, Mentor of Model City Department," The Houston Post, May 11, 1969, p. 6.

108/ Southern Regional Council, The Negro and Employment Opportunities in the South: Houston (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1961), p. 6.

More specifically, the same report stated:

> The survey reveals an extremely pragmatic attitude on the part of school officials in regard to vocational training in the Houston Independent School District. The only vocational high school in the city--San Jacinto High, an all-white institution--offers full, 3-year courses in air conditioning and refrigeration, automotive mechanics, drafting, machine shop photography, printing, radio, television, and welding. None of these courses is taught in the five Negro high schools. 109/

Since the aforementioned survey, the de jure segregation of the Houston Independent School District's vocational education program has ended. San Jacinto High School has remained the major vocational school in the school system. By 1967, however, more than one-fourth of its 1,571 students were black as opposed to zero black enrollment in 1961. In fact, in terms of both absolute and relative numbers, it was in 1967 the most integrated school in the district. A comparison of the vocational courses offered between San Jacinto and three all-black high schools in the HISD is presented in table 24. Unfortunately, there is no racial breakdown available for the San Jacinto classes. Although the course offerings at Wheatley, Worthing, and Yates contain a number of classes for "traditional Negro jobs" (i.e., dry cleaning, commercial cooking, dressmaking, or vocational agriculture), the picture is far different from that described in the 1961 study. It is difficult to explain why the classes in air conditioning and refrigeration and in welding were canceled at Worthing. Both occupations are in short supply in Houston. The HISD explanation was simply "lack of interest" by the students.

Nonetheless, given the expanding technical needs of the Houston labor market, the level of operation and the array of course offerings seem inadequate. The need for broadening the course offerings for women seems apparent. The absence of a State-supported junior college program in the city makes the responsibility of the HISD in offering more vocational and technical courses mandatory.

MISCELLANEOUS PROGRAMS

Aside from the preceding undertakings, a number of other employment programs at least deserve mention. The 16-county area surrounding Houston was allotted 1,436 slots in the Job Corps for fiscal year 1969. The TEC reports that it has had great difficulty meeting its quota of men but that it has had no problem finding sufficient numbers of women. Although racial figures are not available, officials acknowledge that "a great number" of the referrals have been blacks. In passing, the TEC did report that the strong family ties of many Mexican Americans have hampered their recruitment into the Job Corps and have contributed to a disproportionate black participation rate.

109/ Ibid., p. 7.

TABLE 24. COMPARISON OF VOCATIONAL COURSE OFFERINGS BETWEEN SAN JACINTO HIGH SCHOOL AND THREE ALL-BLACK HIGH SCHOOLS IN HOUSTON IN 1967

Courses offered	Potential enrollment			
	San Jacinto	Wheatley	Worthing	Yates
Total	1,364	364	370	978
Automotive mechanics	76	40	40	40
Bookkeeping machines	160	0	0	90
Commercial art	48	0	0	48
Commercial cooking	0	40	0	40
Comptometer	240	0	0	90
Cosmetology	0	0	50	50
Dental assistant	40	0	0	0
Distributive education	40	40	0	40
Drafting	48	0	0	48
Dressmaking	0	40	0	40
Dry cleaning	0	0	0	40
Electronic data processing	72	0	0	0
General metals	0	44	0	44
Machine shop	76	0	0	0
Photography	40	0	0	40
Printing	0	0	0	36
Printing (letterpress)	36	0	0	0
Printing (offset)	28	0	0	0
Radio and television	80	0	0	40
Refrigeration and air conditioning	76	0	[1] 40	0
Secretarial training	144	0	0	72
Vocational agriculture	0	0	0	60
Vocational homemaking	0	120	120	120
Vocational nursing	40	40	0	0
Vocational occupational cooperative training	40	0	40	40
Vocational office education	0	0	40	0
Welding	80	0	[1] 40	0

[1] Classes canceled for "lack of interest."

Source: "Houston Independent School District, Secondary Schools, Vocational Education Offerings," 1967 (xerox material provided by officials of the HISD), pp. 3-5. (HISD officials claim that the total program for the entire system is running at about 80 percent capacity of potential enrollment.)

With respect to availing itself of the various Federal job-training programs for eligible welfare clients, Houston has little record. Texas did not participate in the Community Work and Training Program created under the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act. A similar program--the Work Experience and Training (WET) program established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964--has been operative in the State but, according to TEC, not in Houston. Beginning in July 1969, the Work Incentive Program (WIN)--which replaced the WET program--authorized in a 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act became effective in Texas. WIN is designed to afford opportunities for direct job placement, job training, and public employment to welfare recipients. Houston participates in WIN, but it is too early at this moment to comment upon its experience.

The Houston Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program is sponsored by a number of diverse groups. The Cresant Foundation, the Neighborhood Center Association, and the Harris County Department of Education sponsor the in-school programs, whereas the Vocational Guidance Service (a United Fund Agency in the city) and the Harris County Commissioners Court are the out-of-school NYC sponsors. The in-school programs for fiscal year 1969 numbered 170, 214, and 211 slots, respectively, for each sponsoring agency; the two out-of-school programs totaled 431 and 150 slots, respectively.

The scant statistics on enrollee characteristics indicate that women and minority group members dominate the Houston programs. In fact, one official of the Vocational Guidance Service (VGS) expressed concern that the "designed reduction" in the number of Anglos in NYC "may prove dangerous in the long run." 110/ The fear that needy Anglos may conclude that they are being excluded from an equal opportunity to participate in NYC and other Federal programs was expressed by several officials in the city.

As is the case with the other manpower programs, the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program in Houston has been dominated by female participants. Cumulative enrollment figures through mid-1968 indicate that the ratio of women to men was about 3 to 1. In sharp contrast, the national NYC figures over the same timespan were 54-percent male to 46-percent female. 111/ The explanation for the female domination of NYC in Houston rests again with the peculiarities of a tight labor market with virtually no social legislation to protect the peripheral labor force. Thus, a report on the NYC program in Houston disclosed that:

> . . . some adolescent females had worked for as little as 60 cents and 70 cents an hour in ghetto cafes and laundries or as babysitters. Carhops, busgirl, waitress, hospital worker--all these jobs netted only from $35 to $40 a week for many girls. 112/

110/ From personal interview with an official of the Vocational Guidance Service, Houston, Tex. (June 20, 1968).

111/ 1969 Manpower Report of the President (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 244.

112/ Edwin Harwood, "Youth Unemployment--A Tale of Two Ghettos," The Public Interest, Fall 1969, pp. 82-83.

Thus, the allowance of $1.25 per hour provided by the NYC was more attractive than the exploitive wages available as alternatives in the private sector. The same report found that some female NYC trainees who subsequently entered the private sector were forced to take lower pay and endure less desirable working conditions. On several occasions, women returned to the NYC program rather than work long hours at lower pay in the private economy of the city. In some instances, where the private sector wages were in fact higher than $1.25 per hour, the difference was so small and--in comparison--the tasks so much more rigorous that they, too, returned to NYC. Moreover, NYC officials were seen to be more tolerant of absenteeism than were private employers, and the NYC program offered a more congenial atmosphere than did the discipline of a low-wage factory environment.

The VGS also sponsors Houston's New Careers program, which seeks to place disadvantaged people into subprofessional occupations with the hope that training and job exposure may facilitate their career advancement. In 1968, VGS had 25 contracts with different employers in the city, and it had openings for 250 enrollees. Most of the placements have been with the Veterans Hospital. Again, however, VGS officials indicated that women composed 81 percent (209 of the 232 enrollees) of the participants. Since VGS operates the New Careers program for the CEP, it has reflected the overall CEP enrollee racial characteristics (over 80-percent black).

Another VGS venture of long-term significance for altering black employment patterns is the provision of group guidance in several predominantly black junior and senior high schools. It has been recognized that many black youth in Houston have little information about available job opportunities or how to prepare for vocations. 113/

In summarizing the need for an expanded program, the VGS reported:

> Historically, minority group youth have been relegated to the unskilled, semiskilled, and service areas of the occupational hierarchy. To a great extent, this tradition is still maintained today. It is highly visible to these youth who return home from school each day and see their parents, their friends, and their relatives returning home from jobs which have little future and provide little for the present. Their occupational horizons are very narrow due to the historical tradition as well as to their youth and immaturity. And discrimination in industry, business, and commerce has further limited the opportunities for the poor and deprived and which also limits their occupational horizons and dampens their hopes for the future. 114/

113/ See, for example, B. A. Turner, Occupational Choices of High School Seniors in the Space Age (Houston: Texas Southern University, 1964).

114/ Vocational Guidance Service, A Job Placement and Group Vocational Guidance Program for Underprivileged High School Seniors, p. 4.

There is yet another federally sponsored program that potentially has significance for minority members. In Houston, a U.S. Veterans Assistance Center aids educationally disadvantaged veterans who do not have high school diplomas or a general equivalency diploma (called Group I). As the names of all such individuals who are planning to enter the Houston labor market are received from military separation centers across the country, each is contacted by letter or telephone call. The center informs the veterans of existing educational and training programs in which they may participate. In some instances, the Houston center has been able to arrange transitional appointments with the Federal Civil Service (in grades GS-1 to GS-5) for veterans who need to work during the day so that they can attend classes at night. Under this special arrangement, if the veteran quits going to school, he loses his job. It is estimated by the staff of the center that about 1,000 people personally visited the center during 1968, with many more writing and telephoning for information. Although the center does not keep racial statistics on those visiting the center and has no knowledge of the race of those who call in or write to it, the staff estimates that at least 50 percent of the Group I people it has served in Houston have been blacks. The center does not have a record of its placements into specific programs since it merely refers the veterans to programs available in the city. 115/

SUMMARY

Houston has partaken of most of the available Federal programs in the employment, training, and remedial education area. Relative to the universe of need (as discussed in chapters II and III), the impact of these programs upon prevailing black employment patterns has been virtually unfelt. In the 1970 Houston CAMPS survey, it was estimated that 171,000 people in the Houston area had need of manpower services. 116/ Yet, in the same year, the total enrollment in all programs was 14,660, which left 158,840 needy people unserved. 117/ Unquestionably, the largest percentage of those in need are black. Thus, while individual programs enroll several hundred people, the universe of need numbers in the tens of thousands. With a swelling ghetto population, Houston is losing ground in its efforts to respond to the social needs of its citizens.

To be relevant to the demands of the Houston labor market, manpower policy needs to be made more flexible to local conditions. The "poverty criteria" should be suspended for as long as the overall unemployment rate in Houston remains, say, below 3 percent. To increase eligibility, the "poverty-income criteria" should not be the $3,600 (for an urban family of four) but, say, the U. S. Department of Labor's low-cost budget figure of $5,600 (for an urban family of four). For men, policy focus should be twofold. First, in the large employer sector,

115/ The material covered in this paragraph was gathered from a number of personal interviews with staff personnel of the U.S. Veterans Assistance Center, Houston, Tex. (June 26, 1968).

116/ "Gulf Coast Comprehensive Manpower Plan," p. 14.

117/ Ibid.

all funds should be expended for upgrading. It is clear that black men can easily obtain entry-level jobs without any assistance from manpower endeavors. Typically, however, black men are not able to advance to better occupational positions. Manpower programs should fill this gap. Secondly, the experience of the Cresant Foundation's OJT program indicates the existence of a latent need to expand on-the-job training in the small business sector. The EEOC data show that most blacks are employed by the small businesses; yet there appears little recognition of this basic fact in current program operations.

For black women, it is doubtful that manpower policy can offer any significant assistance until the pervasive patterns of exclusion from job entry are overcome. As matters stand, for many women these endeavors have become forms of income maintenance rather than skill endowment. The fault rests not with the participants or with the programs per se but with the way employment decisions are made in the Houston economy. The current predicament has been synthesized in the 1970 Houston CAMPS statement:

> Most manpower programs in this area are comprised of 75 percent female clients. On the other hand, the labor market of Houston and surrounding counties cannot absorb the large influx of women in traditional female occupations such as secretaries, cooks, etc. The resultant effect is a manpower pool of semi-trained women seeking employment, but few female-oriented jobs. 118/

Under these circumstances, the only viable path for manpower programs to pursue, if they are to have meaning for women, is to train them for shortage occupations currently designated as "men's jobs." To continue training for "women's jobs" when there is little hope of satisfactory placement is to perpetuate frustration. To accomplish placement of women in "men's jobs," it may be necessary to work in tandem with local Equal Employment Opportunity Commission officials. To date, there is scant evidence that manpower policy and equal employment opportunity policy are aware of each other's existence. Until they become congruent, there is little hope for the success of either.

With specific regard to blacks in the Houston labor market, manpower programs are not addressing themselves to the needs of black men and are inadequately serving black women. It is no surprise, therefore, that there was not a single interviewee contacted during the course of this study who had a single favorable comment to make about the presence or impact of manpower programs.

118/ Ibid., p. 12.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The employment status of black workers in urban labor markets is known to be wanting throughout this country. It is often presumed that a tight labor market is a virtual panacea for bringing forth a climate of change in racial employment patterns. A review of the Houston experience should put to rest such simplistic notions. The occupational and industrial employment patterns of black Houstonians have been shown to be worse than those of blacks in the Nation as a whole and virtually identical to those of blacks throughout the South.

In June 1970, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission held public hearings in Houston. In announcing these hearings, Chairman William H. Brown disclosed that the EEOC had analyzed the penetration rates of minorities into industries, the occupational position of minorities in these industries, and minority participation in a number of specific jobs in the 46 largest labor markets in the Nation. The result of this comparative analysis was that Houston employers were found to be "among the worst, if not the worst in the Nation."119/ "Houston ranked 45th or 46th in every category."120/ Near the conclusion of these hearings, Chairman Brown added this assessment:

> I think I'd be candid enough to say that while the picture we had, based on our statistics and our investigation of Houston, was quite appalling to us, the picture which has been presented here, during the three days of hearings, is even worse than we anticipated.121/

The Houston economy is booming. Yet the characteristic industrial expansion and labor shortages have provided little in the way of advancement opportunity for the city's sizable black labor force. It is true that black unemployment rates are low when compared to many urban labor centers; but the familiar relationship of the black rate being twice the white rate also holds true. Nonetheless the critical issue is not unemployment per se. Most black men who seek jobs find them. But the jobs they hold are typically in personal services, in small business enterprises, and in declining occupational categories. Where black men have penetrated growth industries, they

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119/ "Houston is One of the Worst," The Houston Post, May 15, 1970, sec. 2, p. 8. (The quotation was a statement by William H. Brown III, Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.)

120/ Jim Curran, "Houston Employers Rank Poorly in Hiring Minorities," The Houston Chronicle, May 31, 1970, sec. 4, p.2. (The quotation was a statement by William H. Brown III, Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.)

121/ They Have the Power, p. 85.

are overwhelmingly concentrated in the lowest paying occupations. Few black men hold white-collar jobs. For black women, the employment patterns are so patently exclusionary as to warrant immediate investigation. The paramount issue for black women is their inability to penetrate major industries. As most of these large enterprises have substantial numbers of female employees, the paucity of black women can only be attributed to pervasive discrimination.

Hence, the priorities of public policy for black men and for black women must be separated. For the men, the primary need is to provide substantial opportunities for upgrading or entry into jobs that may not afford advancement but do provide substantial income (as the skilled craft occupations). The objectives of all training enterprises in Houston--be they academic schools, vocational schools, MDTA classes, the JOBS Program, or simply private training programs--should be geared to these objectives. With a demonstrated surplus of available entry jobs, there is no justification for the expenditure of funds for the preparation, recruitment, or placement of men for such positions. The expansion of the night school programs at the CEP center and by the HISD's vocational education division would seem to be a mandatory first step. The establishment of a vocationally oriented community college is a similar must. The Apprenticeship Outreach Program must be removed from the sponsorship of the local building trades council. In addition, with most black men currently being employed in small business, special attention should be given to an expansion of on-the-job training in this sector.

For black women, discriminatory barriers are the immediate problem. Training and job placement offer little hope for more than ad hoc accomplishments. Given the gross inadequacies of the welfare system of the State of Texas, the fact that women often must supplement their husband's earnings or serve as breadwinners and the limited and often nonapplicable minimum wage law in the major employment sectors for women, they require special attention. With the existence of pervasive discriminatory job patterns public policy should set its primary sights toward the eradication of these obstacles. It is of little significance to train black women for jobs in which they cannot be placed under prevailing hiring practices. The suspicion that many of the manpower programs for black women are serving an income maintenance function rather than a training function seems justified. Until the hiring practices are altered, they can realistically perform little other purpose.

Although there have been some changes in the recent past, there is no indication of change on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. With the black population increasing both absolutely and relatively, public and private remedial efforts must run simply to keep pace. Indications are that the current undertakings--while substantial when compared to the void of the past--are inadequate in terms of the needs of the present.

Despite the battery of public and private manpower programs in operation, only surface changes seem to be the results. Fundamental alterations have yet to occur. The tight labor market has spawned a satisfaction by local officials with quantitative results rather than qualitative improvements. That is to say, many spokesmen smugly remark that any one who wants "a job" can find one in Houston. There seems to be little serious concern about "the types of jobs" in which blacks are concentrated. A complaint by a regional official of the Texas Employment Commission in Houston serves as a good example:

> In many of the Houston ghettos, the labor force is about 80 percent females who have been deserted by their spouses. Black activists have been going in there and agitating these women by telling them that they should not go into 'tradition jobs' as domestics.122/

The philosophy that "a job is a job" is to be revered in times of mass unemployment (as in the 1930's); but it is grossly insufficient in an era of tight labor demand and social change (as in the 1960's). For as the popular saying in the ghettos goes, "We had full employment back on the plantations."

Manpower programs could assume an important role in meeting the needs of both economically disadvantaged workers and the Houston economy. To accomplish this, however, their current operational format needs a drastic overhaul. Houston represents a classic study of structural imbalance in the labor market. The 1970 Houston CAMPS report stated that "a booming and rapidly expanded economy has created a demand for skilled workers of all types."123/ Yet, the manpower programs seldom train people for these jobs--many of which could lead to high incomes. Black men are usually disqualified by the rigid income eligibility restrictions or are disinterested in the types of training currently offered, black women are being trained only for female-oriented jobs which have little potential for advancement or growing income. There is no indication that private industry has sought to initiate programs to train unskilled Houstonians for the vacant skilled jobs that they have available. The JOBS Program has dealt largely with placing black men in entry-level jobs which many could (and do) find on their own. If the focus of JOBS were placed entirely upon upgrading, its positive potential could be realized.

122/ From personal interview with a regional official of the Texas Employment Commission, Houston, Tex. (June 19, 1968).

123/ "Gulf Coast Comprehensive Manpower Plan," p. 7.

There seems little doubt that the Houston labor market is capable of absorbing adult black men into entry-level jobs that pay at least the $1.60 Federal minimum wage. But $1.60 an hour for a full-time employed person provides an annual income of only $3,200. Such an amount is known to be inadequate for a breadwinner to support a family. The occupational structure described in the preceding pages reveals that blacks were clustered in the lowest paying, least skilled, and most competitive jobs in the city. These are the employment patterns described by Elliot Liebow (in his now classic study of black streetcorner men) where:

> The job is not a stepping stone to something better. It is a dead end. It promises to deliver no more tomorrow, next month, or next year than it does today.124/

Keenly aware that society indicates its value of the work rendered by the amount it is willing to pay for its performance, Liebow concluded that the man who holds such a job places "no lower value on the job than does the larger society around him."125/

The urgency to alter the prevailing employment patterns of blacks in Houston is exacerbated by the shortcomings of social legislation in Texas. The fundamental minimums of a humane society have yet to be recognized as being desirable public policy. The same indictment can be made for the institutional structure that manipulates the laws and programs that do exist. With regard to social philosophy, the public school system, the city council, the Community Action Agency, the welfare board, and the employment service, all go "through the motions" but with few, if any, results.

The labor market experience of blacks in Houston is no doubt affected by the presence of the other sizable minority group--the Mexican Americans. Yet, although the black labor force in Houston is about triple that of Chicanos, the occupational position of blacks was found to be substantially worse for both men and women. Nonetheless, efforts to improve black employment cannot be separated from the need to do the same for both Mexican Americans and the large poor Anglo population. The economically disadvantaged Anglo population--by all evidence--has been ignored by most of the manpower and poverty programs in the city. It is extremely doubtful that

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124/ Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 63.

125/ Ibid., p. 57.

such a leapfrogging strategy can be successful. The need for wider community support is essential if meaningful institutional adjustment is to occur. Until Angloes are included in a more representative manner, it is unlikely that real support will be forthcoming for these endeavors.

So it is that the words of Thomas Huxley seem a most appropriate conclusion: "Logical consequences are the scarecrows of fools and the beacons of wise men." It is time for Houston to examine the consequences of continued inaction and ambivalence to the employment needs of its minority citizens. In his annual report of 1968 on minority affairs in Houston, the mayor informed the black community that they reside in a "city that cares." There is no doubt that the possibility exists to attain his implied promise; there is serious reason to fear, however, that the major power forces in Houston are so far insensible to the goal.

WHERE TO GET MORE INFORMATION

For more information on manpower programs and services in your area, contact your local employment service office or the nearest office of the Regional Manpower Administrator at the address listed below:

Location	States Served	
John F. Kennedy Fed. Bldg. Boston, Mass. 02203	Connecticut Maine Massachusetts	New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont
341 Ninth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10001	New Jersey New York	Puerto Rico Virgin Islands
P.O. Box 8796 Philadelphia, Pa. 19101	Delaware Maryland Pennsylvania	Virginia West Virginia
D.C. Manpower Administrator 14th and E Streets, NW. Washington, D.C. 20004	District of Columbia	
1371 Peachtree Street, NE. Atlanta, Ga. 30309	Alabama Florida Georgia Kentucky	Mississippi North Carolina South Carolina Tennessee
219 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Ill. 60604	Illinois Indiana Michigan	Minnesota Ohio Wisconsin
911 Walnut Street Kansas City, Mo. 64106	Iowa Kansas	Missouri Nebraska
411 North Akard Street Dallas, Tex. 75201	Arkansas Louisiana New Mexico	Oklahoma Texas
Federal Office Bldg. 1961 Stout Street Denver, Colo. 80202	Colorado Montana North Dakota	South Dakota Utah Wyoming
450 Golden Gate Avenue San Francisco, Calif. 94102	Arizona California Hawaii Nevada	American Samoa Guam Trust Territories
Arcade Plaza 1321 Second Avenue Seattle, Wash. 98101	Alaska Idaho	Oregon Washington